There is something deeply contradictory in the current situation. Public health facilities in Morocco have experienced shortages of rapid HIV tests lasting over a year in some cases. Patients are turned away without screening, while domestic manufacturers have ready-to-deliver kits. This shortage, confirmed by healthcare workers and an investigation, is not just a logistical issue. It signals a deeper dysfunction in public procurement for health, where national preference, though enshrined in law, remains a dead letter.
Moroccan law is clear. Decree No. 2.22.431, which governs public procurement, includes a national preference mechanism. It states that technical specifications in tenders should be based on performance and function, not on a specific brand, origin, or patent. According to Abdelhay Rhorba, a professor at Hassan II University of Casablanca and researcher in administrative law of public procurement, violating this principle is legally actionable.
“Including overly specific technical conditions or demanding certifications only held by a particular competitor violates the principle of equal opportunity,” he explains, “and can constitute an abuse of power.” Moroccan administrative courts assess such situations using a simple criterion: unjustified exclusion. If a tender document, even if formally correct, ends up excluding local producers, it can be challenged.
Recourse exists: a graceful appeal to the National Commission of Public Procurement before the contract is awarded, then a complaint to administrative courts within sixty days. In cases of suspected corruption, Moroccan criminal law provisions on influence peddling can also be used.
But fighting the administration requires resources.
On the ground, sector insiders describe a raw reality. The special prescription documents (CPS) that define tender requirements are, according to multiple sources, drafted based on already-used foreign products, perpetuating old contracts without considering new national production capabilities.
A Moroccan medical device manufacturer, speaking on condition of anonymity, describes a Kafkaesque situation. His lab sells products in several African countries but holds less than 2% of the Moroccan public market in his segment. “CPS should be based on Moroccan products, which is not done today,” he says.
When an industry player asks the project owner for clarification that a tender is skewed toward a foreign product, the response is often silence or inaction. The public contract remains unchanged.
The contradiction reaches beyond the Ministry of Health to the heart of government. While the Ministry of Finance recently raised customs duties on certain imported medical devices to encourage local production, the Ministry of Health, according to sector sources, continues to buy more expensive imported products, ignoring available local equivalents at competitive prices.
When contacted, the Ministry of Health’s Directorate of Supply of Medicines and Health Products offered its view. It said it acts “in strict compliance with the regulatory framework in force” and stated that tenders are “open to all operators meeting the required conditions, with special attention to operators established in Morocco.” However, a nuance: the requirement concerns the location of companies, not the origin of manufacturing. Thus, an importer based in Morocco is treated equally to a local manufacturer.
The HIV test case is particularly telling. According to information gathered, the stockout at some facilities lasted over a year. The ministry confirmed in its written response that “occasional tensions may have been observed in certain health structures,” attributing them to “delays related to public procurement procedures and disruptions in global supply chains.” Tenders are currently underway to secure supply, and “complementary alternatives” are being studied.
This explanation leaves several sector observers skeptical. If local producers have available, approved stock, why did shortages persist for months without emergency orders?
On the question of direct contracting, the ministry is firm: “No direct contracting procedures were used in this context.” The 2025 acquisitions would have been conducted “exclusively through calls for tender, in full compliance with regulations.” This statement directly contradicts information from several sources close to the matter. Without official public documents, a definitive conclusion is not possible at this stage.
Direct contracting is only legal under limited conditions: unforeseeable extreme urgency, justified technical exclusivity, or failed tender. Decree No. 2.22.431 requires written justification and proof of lack of alternatives, Abdelhay Rhorba notes. “Otherwise, using this procedure is considered illegal.”
Health sovereignty: a distant ideal
Behind public procurement lies the critical question of Morocco’s health sovereignty. Professor Jaafar Heikel, a renowned infectious disease specialist, offers an important nuance: the absence of rapid tests does not mean total inability to diagnose. Public and private labs can still perform standard biological analyses. But rapid tests have unique value in accessibility, speed, and reaching populations that don’t use conventional facilities.
“NGOs like OPALS and ALCS play an extremely important role in HIV screening in Morocco,” he emphasizes. “They need these tests to reach people who might not go to a lab.” Disrupting their supply therefore has real consequences for on-the-ground response.
On local production, Professor Heikel is clear: “When these locally manufactured tests are validated by state structures, it’s very beneficial for the country, first financially, and because it moves us toward health sovereignty.”
2030 at risk?
Morocco has committed to UNAIDS’ 95-95-95 targets: 95% of people living with HIV know their status, 95% of diagnosed people are on treatment, and 95% of treated people have undetectable viral load. These goals aim to end AIDS as a public health threat by 2030. They depend on broad, rapid, accessible testing.
“When there are no tests, fewer people are screened, and the disease has more chance to spread,” sums up a manufacturer. Professor Heikel agrees: “We will achieve the 95-95-95 targets faster if we have rapid tests and validated national production.”
For its part, the Ministry of Health says it remains “fully mobilized to ensure continuity of screening services.” A mobilization that industry players are waiting to see reflected in actual practice and in the special prescription documents.
Today, sources are openly questioning: could members of the tender compliance and validation committees be acting to protect their own interests, or those of established foreign suppliers, in disregard of ministerial directives?
An investor developing a validated product, responding to a tender, and being systematically excluded will not do so indefinitely. The risk is simple: discouraging investment in national production at the very moment Morocco needs it most—and continuing to buy abroad what the country can make itself.
