An analysis published on 8 June 2026 triggered widespread debate after revealing that several French officers have returned to N’Djamena since mid-April to revive military cooperation between France and Chad, less than two years after the historic decision that ended the French military presence in Chad.
According to this analysis, although Paris says it does not plan to redeploy permanent forces on Chadian soil, the mere resumption of military cooperation and intelligence sharing raises serious questions about the impact on President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno’s image and the credibility of the political narrative he has championed since coming to power.
A contradiction with sovereignty and pan-African rhetoric
In the months following the departure of French forces, President Déby presented that decision as a victory for national sovereignty and a reclamation of the state’s strategic independence. He linked it to a discourse promoting emancipation from foreign dependencies and the strengthening of balanced partnerships, in line with the pan-African momentum gaining influence in the region.
Now, the resumption of military cooperation with Paris, even in a limited form, could be seen as a step back from one of the most emblematic sovereign decisions touted by the regime. This is especially true since Chadian authorities have repeatedly justified the end of military agreements by citing a lack of concrete results and strong popular pressure demanding the departure of French troops.
A risk to Chad’s regional image
Over the past two years, Chad has managed to consolidate its image as an influential regional security power, capable of responding to threats through cooperation with neighbours and diversification of international partnerships. President Déby has also positioned himself as a regional mediator and a key player in stabilisation efforts in the Sahel and Central Africa.
However, returning under the French intelligence umbrella could weaken this image and create the impression that N’Djamena ultimately failed to break free from its traditional partner, despite rhetoric favouring strategic autonomy.
A fundamental element cannot be ignored: the decision to end the French military presence also responded to popular demand expressed through several protests calling for France to leave Chad. Therefore, any rapprochement with Paris risks provoking discontent among a large segment of the public, who viewed the French withdrawal as a sovereign gain that should not be reversed.
France, which politically opposed Déby and hosted the opposition
The paradox is that France, now returning as a security partner, was one of the main sources of pressure on Déby’s regime over the past two years.
In July 2024, accusations against the Chadian president and several family members were brought to light by French justice, investigating suspicions of public fund embezzlement and expenses on luxury hotels, high-end vehicles, and expensive clothing. These cases were reactivated in March 2026, accompanied by recurring speculation about a possible freeze of assets and accounts linked to the presidential family.
Returning to cooperation with a state that used its judicial and media institutions to personally target the head of state’s image raises legitimate questions about the degree of political trust that can exist between the two parties.
Meanwhile, France hosted the largest gathering of Chadian political and politico-military opposition in Nantes in October 2025. Nearly twenty organisations and movements participated, aiming to coordinate their political, diplomatic, and military efforts against the authorities in N’Djamena.
Paris also played a notable role in the Succès Masra affair, through the involvement of French lawyers in his defence, steps to facilitate his transfer to France for medical care, and media coverage of the case in the French parliament and various European and international institutions.
Between security imperatives and political cost
No one denies that Chad faces growing security challenges in the Lake Chad region and along its eastern and northern borders. However, the question now is whether the potential security benefits of a rapprochement with Paris justify the political and symbolic cost of such a move.
President Déby has built much of his legitimacy on a discourse centred on sovereignty, independence, and rejection of any form of foreign dependency. Any resumption of military cooperation with France could therefore undermine the credibility of that discourse and give his political opponents an opportunity to question the sincerity of the sovereignist project he has championed for years.
Finally, the analysis poses an essential question: how can one justify a return to a political, media, and judicial partner that hosted the opposition, criticised the regime, and tried to pressure it on multiple files, only to be presented to the public again as an indispensable partner for the future of national security?
