The Sahel Province of the Islamic State continues to hold sway in northeastern Mali, even as the JNIM draws greater attention.
The regions of Gao—particularly the Ansongo district—and Ménaka remain hotspots where the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP), formerly known as EIGS, sustains its operations. Within this area, the trio of settlements referred to as the “3 T’s”—Talataye, Tin-Hama, and Tessit—alongside Labbezanga, form the backbone of the group’s territorial control and sustained pressure on local communities.
Leadership dynamics
The ISSP is currently led by Abou Al-Bara, who took over after Adnan Abu Al-Walid Sahraoui was killed in 2021. While the group’s command structure retains some ambiguity, its operational tactics have evolved since 2020. Once notorious for public executions and mass terror, the ISSP now focuses on establishing localized governance, controlling key territories, and embedding itself within communities—all while minimizing high-profile attacks that draw unwanted attention.
Yet military operations against the group show no signs of slowing. In a recent strike, Malian forces neutralized an ISSP operational commander in Bara, Ansongo district, during an overnight aerial raid on May 14–15, 2026. The operation also resulted in the elimination of several affiliated fighters, underscoring the persistent pressure on the group’s strongholds while highlighting its resilience in reconsolidating networks across border regions.
Operational reach
The ISSP continues to assert dominance over critical zones along the Mali-Niger corridor, including Talataye, Tin-Hama, Tessit, Labbezanga, and Ménaka. By regulating the movement of people and goods, the group reinforces its influence over local armed factions and secures control over these regional pathways.
The rivalry with the JNIM remains a defining feature of Sahel security dynamics. While the JNIM’s recent surge in visibility—marked by coordinated attacks on April 25, 2026, near Bamako and across multiple localities—has captured headlines, the ISSP’s presence has not waned. The two groups operate with distinct strategies: the JNIM leans toward high-profile, media-driven strikes, whereas the ISSP prioritizes subtle territorial control, community pressure, and securing strategic transit routes.
Initial defections from the JNIM once fostered a rare détente in the Sahel, limiting direct confrontations. However, since 2020, this fragile truce has eroded. Recent security developments, including Malian military offensives, have temporarily redirected both groups toward a shared adversary—though no formal peace accord has been reached.
Emerging threats
ACLED reports from May 15, 2026, indicate that 86% of Islamic State activity worldwide in Q1 2026 occurred in Africa, with a marked rise in armed drone strikes, motorized assaults, and economic pressure tactics targeting both urban and rural areas. The ISSP has targeted critical infrastructure along the Ménaka–Ansongo–Tessit axis and Labbezanga, exploiting local vulnerabilities to impose de facto governance. A February 7, 2026, attack on a civilian convoy near Kobé, just 35 km from Gao, exemplifies this strategy.
While international counterterrorism efforts have neutralized key figures—such as Abu-Bilal Al-Minuki, killed in a Nigeria-United States operation in the Lake Chad basin on May 16, 2026—the ISSP’s threat persists in northeastern Mali. Its influence endures in the “3 T’s” and Labbezanga, where territorial control and sway over local armed groups remain entrenched.
The ISSP remains a dominant force in Mali’s northeast, leveraging the JNIM and FLA’s media spotlight to strengthen its position, assert control over populations, and sustain pressure on Malian forces. Its structured territorial presence and adaptive tactics underscore the depth of the challenge—one that demands intensified focus on strategic zones, particularly the Niger-Mali border.
