Eighteen months after the July 26, 2023 takeover in Niamey, the promises of “Refoundation” and radical break are crashing against the reality of oil management. At the heart of power, newly appointed Petroleum Minister Hamadou Tini stands accused of wearing multiple hats in defiance of basic ethical rules. Judge and party, the former senior figure at the audit firm Mazars now uses state authority to revive contracts for his private structure, demanding unrestricted access to SORAZ’s secrets. An investigation into a conflict of interest at the top of the state, where financial auditing has become a weapon for purges and enrichment.
From rupture rhetoric to the return of lobbies
After seizing power, the military officers of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) made economic sovereignty their primary battle. Their priority target was clear: the management of oil resources, especially the Zinder Refining Company (SORAZ). On state television, putschist propaganda railed against the fallen democratic system and its international “accomplices.”
Among them, the international consulting firm Mazars—a partner of the Nigerien state for a decade—was dramatically rejected. Accused by the new regime—and by Chinese partners of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)—of producing biased audits, Mazars seemed permanently banished from Niger’s economic landscape. The official line was uncompromising: Niamey must hire a neutral, independent international firm with no taint of suspicion to scrutinize SORAZ.
Yet behind the scenes, the reality of influence networks quickly dampened popular enthusiasm. Through intense lobbying manoeuvres, one of Mazars’ key figures managed to insert himself into the state apparatus. In January 2026, under the direct protection of General Mody, accountant Hamadou Tini was catapulted to head the Ministry of Petroleum. A nomination that marks the triumphant return of the firm he served just weeks earlier.
Minister Tini: client, provider, and signatory
No sooner had he settled into his ministerial chair than Hamadou Tini put into practice the popular saying that “charity begins at home.” Using his official authority, the minister immediately placed the financial and management audit of SORAZ back on the agenda. But the move came with a non‑negotiable condition: this highly strategic mission must be entrusted to his own firm, Mazars—ostensibly to let it “complete its work and get paid.”
This contractual revival pushes the concept of conflict of interest to rarely equalled levels. The petroleum minister simultaneously acts as the client ordering the audit on behalf of the Nigerien state, the provider executing the mission through his firm Mazars, the ultimate recipient of audit reports, and the sole signatory of public cheques paying for the service.
This accumulation of roles deprives the Nigerien state of any guarantee of independence. How can a firm objectively audit a public company when its own mentor and former senior executive is the supervising minister?
The ukase of discord: race for confidential documents
The strong‑arm move did not stop at contract signing. With the transition’s future uncertain, time is pressing for the Tini clan. The minister has just issued a virtual ukase—an order brooking no reply—to SORAZ’s management. Through a ministerial directive, Hamadou Tini demands that Mazars be handed “without delay or restriction all financial, accounting, technical and operational documents within eight days.” These are precisely the strategic and confidential data that the refinery management and Chinese partners had obstinately refused him in the past to protect trade secrets.
In Niamey, local observers quote another piece of folk wisdom to sum up the situation: “He who has looked through the keyhole already knows what lies on the table.” Perfectly aware of SORAZ’s accounting weaknesses from his former position, the minister knows exactly where to look to get what he wants.
The mystery of sacrificed ministers
This brutal takeover of SORAZ sheds new light on the chronic instability that has plagued the petroleum ministry since the coup. In three years, three ministers have succeeded one another in this strategic post—a musical chairs game intimately linked to the Zinder refinery’s secrets.
Before Hamadou Tini’s arrival, Minister Mahaman Moustapha Barké had grandly announced in June 2024 the launch of a major SORAZ financial audit. A few months later, on 13 January 2025, he was arrested and sequestered by the General Directorate of Documentation and External Security (DGDSE). Detained in secret for nearly a year, without any judicial process, until his release on 6 January 2026. His successor, Dr. Sahabi Oumarou, appointed in haste, also tried to revive the audit in February 2025 before being swiftly removed from his post.
Consistent sector sources now accuse Hamadou Tini of playing an active role in his predecessors’ downfall. While still an expert for Mazars, he allegedly wrote deliberately biased memos and reports to discredit Barké and Oumarou’s management before the junta. The technical aim was twofold: remove obstacles to Mazars’ return and shape the ministerial post for a custom‑fit profile—his own.
A “refoundation” on dialysis
The SORAZ affair highlights the deep contradictions of the Niamey regime. While the Nigerien population suffers the full brunt of the economic consequences of diplomatic isolation and still awaits the promised benefits from oil wealth, the resources of the black‑gold mine seem to serve corporate interests first. The SORAZ audit, originally demanded by civil society as an act of transparency and public health, has become a tool in a clan war. In the hands of the minister‑auditor, it serves both as a shield to mask conflicts of interest and as a cash drawer for his former firm. For the “Refoundation” promised by the CNSP, the diagnosis is harsh: the management of Nigerien oil has not changed methods—it has merely changed beneficiaries.
