The Russian-backed Africa Corps is repositioning its combatants away from Mali’s northern regions, prioritizing the defense of the capital, Bamako, and the ruling junta. This strategic adjustment sees them providing crucial air support and intelligence to Malian soldiers operating on the ground.
“Their overall role has become more supportive,” observed Benedict Manzin, a leading analyst for the Middle East and Africa at the UK-based intelligence firm Sybiline. He added, “They are taking every measure to prevent further casualties, aiming to minimize personnel exposure while maximizing the impact of their operations.”
The Africa Corps assumed its current role around mid-2024, succeeding the infamous Wagner Group mercenaries. This transition followed significant losses suffered by Wagner, with dozens of fighters ambushed by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) alongside Malian troops near Tin Zaouatine, close to the Algerian border.
As a unit under the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Africa Corps maintains approximately 2,000 personnel in Mali, a considerable number of whom are former Wagner mercenaries. This contingent, however, represents a significant reduction compared to the Wagner force and is roughly half the size of the French Barkhane counter-terrorism operation, which the Malian junta expelled from the country in 2022.
The loss of Kidal in northern Mali to the FLA and the Group to Support Islam and Muslims (GSIM) in late April appears to have been a pivotal factor in the Africa Corps’ decision to consolidate its presence closer to its primary base in Bamako. This development significantly impacts Mali security and West Africa Mali dynamics.
In response, the Africa Corps launched retaliatory airstrikes against Kidal, causing widespread infrastructure damage and forcing residents to flee. These strikes were conducted in support of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), which have now become the dominant ground force in the northern territories.
“We are observing their increased reliance on aerial assets,” Mr. Manzin noted. This has recently included the deployment of Russian-made cluster bombs against communities in the Kidal region, a practice that directly violates Mali’s commitments under the international convention prohibiting the use of such munitions.
Regarding the Africa Corps’ operational constraints, Mr. Manzin stated, “They have fewer resources to expend. They are unwilling to disperse them among small communities in the north where they could be vulnerable to elimination.”
An analysis of recent Africa Corps statements on social media platforms indicates a clear shift in focus towards central and southern Mali, with the majority of their operations now concentrated near Bamako, according to analyst Jacob Boswall. This reflects a significant change in Mali politics and military strategy.
Following their withdrawal from Kidal, the Africa Corps intensified its propaganda campaign, publishing over 500 articles on Telegram and other channels in the weeks immediately after the defeat, as reported by Mr. Boswall.
Beyond airstrikes, the Africa Corps has also attempted to circumvent economic blockades imposed by the GSIM across Mali. Their fighters and air support have begun escorting truck convoys entering the landlocked nation from Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Senegal, providing protection against GSIM attacks.
Even as the Africa Corps endeavors to reduce its battlefield exposure, the GSIM has been actively employing drones to target Russian combatants at their bases. Recent GSIM videos shared on social media depict drone footage showing Russian fighters killed and Russian aircraft damaged by bombs dropped from drones over their Sévaré base.
In response, the Africa Corps has launched its own armed drone strikes against GSIM positions in recent weeks, including a GSIM fuel depot in the Timbuktu region, according to analysts at Africa Terrorism Tracker. This ongoing conflict remains a critical aspect of Bamako news today.
Since late 2021, Mali has allocated nearly a billion dollars to secure the services of the Wagner Group and subsequently the Africa Corps. During this period, the Malian government and its Russian allies have lost control of the northern territories, while the GSIM has expanded its influence across the Sahel. Mr. Manzin observes that this expansion is partly a consequence of the brutal tactics employed by both Russian forces and the FAMa against civilians in the north.
“The strategy adopted by the Malian state is proving counterproductive, ultimately jeopardizing the stability of the state itself. Regrettably, the outcome is an increase in GSIM’s power by alienating and pushing communities into their embrace.”
