Despite regime changes and radical geopolitical shifts, Niamey remains trapped in a grinding conflict. From Mahamadou Issoufou’s Western alliance strategy to Abdourahamane Tiani’s sovereignist rupture, the cruel reality persists: on the ground, the terrorist threat shows no sign of retreat.
Three presidents, two democratic transitions, one coup d’état, and a single constant: bloodshed in the ‘three borders’ region and the Lake Chad basin. In Niger, governments come and go, but the jihadist hydra—embodied by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM)—remains.
When the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) took power in July 2023, it promised to restore security by expelling Western partners. Now, the country faces a harsh reality check. The time has come to take stock of a war that, for now, seems unwinnable.
The Issoufou-Bazoum era: the illusion of a Western shield
Under President Mahamadou Issoufou (2011–2021), Niger positioned itself as a cornerstone of Western strategy in the Sahel. As the Malian state next door crumbled, Niamey became the military hub for France’s Operation Barkhane and the United States’ drone base in Agadez.
His successor, Mohamed Bazoum, attempted to add a layer of political flexibility:
- A ‘hand extended’ approach by initiating dialogues with some repentant fighters.
- Massive investment in training Nigerien special forces.
The downside: while this strategy prevented the country from collapsing, it never eliminated the threat. Worse, the presence of foreign troops fueled deep frustration within parts of the army and the population, who saw it as a loss of sovereignty for insufficient results.
Tiani’s gamble: sovereignty tested by bullets
When General Abdourahamane Tiani and the CNSP overthrew Mohamed Bazoum on July 26, 2023, they justified the takeover by citing ‘the continuous deterioration of the security situation’. What followed is well known: a dramatic break with Paris and Washington, the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali and Burkina Faso, and a strategic rapprochement with Russia (via the Africa Corps) and Turkey.
On the communications front, the change has been radical. The military rulers extol national pride and promise a purely military response, free from Western ‘hidden agendas’.
The harsh reality on the ground
Yet, strategic analysts agree: the departure of Western forces left an immediate capability gap, especially in aerial intelligence and technological surveillance. Complex attacks are multiplying, sometimes targeting entire garnisons of the Nigerien armed forces and causing heavy losses. The subsequent economic blockade in some regions, along with diplomatic isolation, complicates the logistics of a war that costs millions of dollars a day.
Why is Niger stuck in this deadlock?
The common mistake of successive regimes—whether civilian or military—lies in treating a primarily political and social crisis as a military one. Two grand visions have fallen short:
- The Issoufou-Bazoum doctrine bet everything on integration into the international security architecture. Its major weakness was excessive external dependence, disconnected from popular aspirations, making the French narrative inaudible to much of the Nigerien public.
- The Tiani doctrine favors a total geopolitical rupture and a martial sovereignism embodied by the AES. The limits of this formula are already evident: an immediate loss of advanced technological intelligence, suffocating financial isolation, and, paradoxically, an escalation of violence by armed groups exploiting regional disorganization.
In both cases, the root causes remain unchanged: the absence of the state in peripheral areas, the lack of economic prospects for rural youth, and intercommunal conflicts (notably between herders and farmers) that jihadist groups skillfully exploit for recruitment.
Whether waged under the banner of international cooperation or the sovereignist flags of the AES, the war in Niger cannot be won by weapons alone. For General Tiani, the challenge is no longer just to criticize his predecessors’ record, but to prove that the current military formula can protect Nigeriens. Without a massive reintroduction of public services—schools, justice, health clinics—into insecure zones, Niger risks losing this war for good over the long term.
