Following the synchronized assaults on April 25 and 26 that targeted key Malian cities such as Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal, a previously unmentionable topic has re-entered Mali’s security discourse: should direct engagement with jihadist factions be considered? Given the significant scale of this joint offensive by Jnim (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), an Al-Qaïda affiliate, and the Tuareg rebels of the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), numerous analysts and specialists now contend that a purely military strategy is proving insufficient.
The offensive has rapidly expanded across Mali, from its northern reaches to the southern regions. Armed groups executed multiple coordinated attacks against military installations and state symbols in at least six cities, even reaching the vicinity of Bamako. This marked the first time Jnim and the FLA visibly cooperated in such a concerted manner. Established in November 2024 following the dissolution of the Cadre stratégique permanent (CSP), the FLA advocates for the self-determination of Azawad, a vast territory in northern Mali.
These recent assaults have starkly illuminated the Malian regime’s fragility. Neither Assimi Goïta’s junta nor its Russian partners from Africa Corps appear capable of halting the armed groups’ advance. Across regional media and diplomatic spheres, the prospect of engaging in negotiations with Jnim is now being discussed with increasing candor, against a backdrop of Bamako’s gradual strangulation and broader regional entrenchment. Despite this, the junta publicly dismisses any notion of dialogue. Bamako steadfastly maintains its exclusion of « any dialogue with armed terrorist groups, » adhering to a strictly military approach even as the security landscape deteriorates rapidly.
Since late April, pressure on the Malian regime has intensified relentlessly. Violence is escalating throughout the central regions of the country. Just recently, several villages in the Bankass area, including Kouroude and Dougara, came under attack. Reports from local and security sources indicate a combined casualty count of 70 to 80 fatalities from the assaults on Wednesday and Friday.
An unprecedented alliance, a stark warning
Jnim continues to be the primary force driving the jihadist insurgency across the Sahel, impacting Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. For the military juntas forming the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), the predicament is worsening. These regimes, which seized power with pledges to restore security, are struggling to contain a threat that persistently expands. In Mali, for almost a year, attacks have been drawing relentlessly closer to the capital.
« From July 2025, jihadists launched attacks in western Mali, targeting gold panning and industrial sites. They subsequently focused on the Bamako-Dakar corridor, effectively choking the capital, » notes Alain Antil, director of the Ifri’s Sub-Saharan Africa Center. « This time, what is striking is not merely the operation’s scale, but also the deliberate selection of targets. Kati and Bamako represent the very core of the regime, » analyzes Héni Nsaibia of Acled.
The tragic death of Defense Minister Sadio Camara in Kati sent profound tremors through the corridors of power. Simultaneously, the recapture of Kidal in late 2023, once hailed as a significant triumph, now represents a substantial strategic setback.
The strategy of attrition
Even prior to this latest offensive, several specialists had noted a shift in Jnim’s operational strategy. Alain Antil previously explained, « There is a clear intent to establish a more dominant power dynamic, not only through security pressure but also to compel Malian authorities to engage in negotiations. »
The jihadist collective is now attempting to replicate on a national scale tactics previously tested locally: economic blockades, the gradual encirclement of urban centers, and sustained pressure on vital logistical arteries. The researcher emphasizes, « Jnim is actively working to enforce an economic blockade around Bamako. »
According to Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, this tactical approach is designed for the long haul: « They have opted to weaken the government from within, prioritizing a strategy of protracted engagement and exploiting existing vulnerabilities within the military system. » He further states, « Jnim no longer posits the implementation of Sharia law as a prerequisite for peace and now professes an openness to negotiation. »
Within this complex security environment, the ongoing rivalry with the État islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS) introduces an additional layer of instability, as each group strives to expand its territorial control and sphere of influence.
A taboo option becomes unavoidable
Officially, Sahelian governments reject any notion of dialogue. Alain Antil notes, « For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation is not under consideration. The rhetoric remains aggressive, with a military response presented as the sole viable option. »
However, the reality on the ground is considerably more intricate. Atrocities perpetrated by state forces and their allies have severely eroded public trust. Between January 2024 and March 2025, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed by government forces and their Russian partners in Mali, a figure almost five times higher than those attributed to Jnim, according to GI-TOC. This cycle of violence fuels public resentment and inadvertently aids jihadist recruitment efforts.
States must commit to a brave compromise.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel specialist researcher
Confronted with this stalemate, a growing number of experts are advocating for a fundamental shift in approach. Alain Antil of Ifri believes, « The military option, when pursued in isolation, leads to a dead end against the jihadist phenomenon in the Sahel. It must be integrated with political negotiations. » Certain grievances articulated by jihadist groups—such as corruption, demands for justice, and access to resources—could potentially serve as a foundation for discussions, even while acknowledging their violent methods.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa expands on this, stating, « States need to embrace a courageous compromise. The concept would involve incorporating jihadists into the political arena to expose their inherent limitations. » However, he firmly establishes non-negotiable boundaries: « The principles of gender equality and the secular nature of the state are not open for discussion. »
As jihadist offensives continue their relentless advance, the concept of negotiation is transforming from a heresy into a credible political option. For many specialists in Mali, the pertinent question is no longer whether dialogue is necessary, but rather how much longer Bamako can realistically avoid it.
