The coordinated assaults by the Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) on April 25, 2026, signify a profound strategic shift in Mali’s security landscape, unparalleled since 2012. By striking simultaneously in Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré, these groups exposed the inherent vulnerabilities of a security paradigm heavily reliant on foreign partners. The subsequent recapture of Kidal severely undermines the Malian junta’s legitimacy narrative and reveals the limitations of the Russian partnership in confronting jihadist forces. While a direct military takeover of Bamako appears unlikely in the short term, JNIM continues to wage a protracted war of attrition. This escalating instability poses a growing regional contagion risk across the Sahel and extends its shadow to the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea.
The tightening grip on Bamako
The coordinated offensive by JNIM and FLA on April 25, 2026, marks a significant escalation in Mali’s security crisis. The simultaneous and unexpected attacks targeted Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré, reflecting a continuous deterioration observed since 2020, exacerbated by the junta’s rise to power in August of that year.
Initially confined to Mali’s northern rural areas, JNIM has steadily enhanced its capability to strike further afield with increased intensity and coordination. In recent years, its operations have expanded westward and southward into regions previously less affected. Its influence now transcends Malian borders, reaching coastal nations like Togo, Bénin, and Nigeria. Concurrently, the number of attacks attributed to the group has surged, particularly those targeting the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). In July 2024, FAMA, supported by the Russian group Africa Corps, suffered a notable defeat against a coalition of JNIM and the CSD-DPA. Since then, JNIM has launched a series of assaults on military bases in Tombouctou in the north, Bamako in the south, and Kayes in the west. Meanwhile, FAMA has bolstered its capabilities, partly through Bayraktar drones supplied by Turkey, although these are far from sufficient for comprehensive territorial surveillance.
Since September 2025, JNIM has implemented a strategy of economic strangulation against Bamako, a capital city of approximately 3.2 million residents. This involves disrupting logistical routes and targeting fuel convoys. The primary objective is the gradual erosion of governmental legitimacy. By directly impacting the populace’s living conditions, particularly through rising fuel prices and associated economic disruptions, JNIM aims to weaken the junta’s credibility while presenting itself as an alternative. The more the junta’s authority wanes in rural areas and Bamako, the more JNIM appears as a credible alternative and a viable governance option to the population. The capital’s blockade effectively stages the state’s perceived impotence. JNIM seeks to enhance its image not by seizing the capital by force, but by demonstrating the existence of an alternative authority. In areas under its control, the group has established a parallel administrative structure based on Islamic justice, taxation, and trade regulation, enabling it to position itself as a tangible alternative to an absent state.
A military takeover of the capital remains improbable for now, given JNIM’s estimated strength of 5,000 to 6,000 fighters compared to a city that concentrates the bulk of Mali’s security forces and infrastructure. JNIM also lacks sufficient popular support, especially in urban centers. However, isolated attacks on Modibo Keita International Airport, which hosts an Africa Corps base, could intensify. Conversely, rural areas, characterized by minimal state presence, provide fertile ground for the group’s entrenchment. Furthermore, the Bamako blockade suggests that a military capture of the capital is not a short-term objective; the strategy hinges on a primarily psychological war of attrition. Nevertheless, the increasing pressure on Bamako diverts FAMA’s resources, potentially easing their grip on other parts of the territory.
Kidal’s recapture and the narrative’s unraveling
The April 25 attacks underscore this surge in capability. In Kati, the heart of Malian military power, Defense Minister Sadio Camara was killed. In Bamako, Modibo Keita Airport was targeted. In Kidal, JNIM and FLA regained control of the city, which FAMA and Wagner had recaptured in 2023 in what was then hailed as a historic victory. This strategic reversal is unprecedented since 2013, forcing Africa Corps elements to withdraw from both Kidal and Gao. The pressing question now is whether FAMA can reclaim the city in the coming weeks.
Kidal’s recapture by JNIM echoes the dynamics of 2012, when Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups initially cooperated before ideological differences caused a rift. JNIM advocates for the establishment of Sharia law, while Tuareg rebels pursue an autonomist agenda centered on Azawad. Kidal then became a symbol of this division, contested by both factions. These divergences persist today, but the shared opposition to the junta and its Russian partners has fostered an opportunistic tactical convergence. Signs of rapprochement were already evident in March 2025. According to jihadist movement expert Wassim Nasr, negotiations to combine efforts reportedly took place as early as December 2024. Whether this opportunistic coalition is sustainable and capable of retaining Kidal remains to be seen.
These attacks occurred despite an alleged truce that was supposed to be signed in late March 2026 between JNIM and the Malian government, reportedly involving the release of jihadists in exchange for lifting the fuel blockade on Bamako. Mali subsequently denied releasing 200 jihadists. The veracity of this agreement remains questionable. Regardless of its existence, it clearly failed to halt JNIM’s offensive momentum.
On April 28, JNIM declared a
