Escalating economic warfare: jihadists push beyond the Sahel into west africa

by the numbers: violence and instability in 2025

From January to November 2025, the human cost of this escalating crisis became starkly evident:

• Over 10,000 deaths were recorded in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger as political violence surged
• 30 foreign nationals were kidnapped in Mali (22) and Niger (8)
• Benin experienced a nearly 70% spike in fatalities compared to the same period in 2024

militant groups escalate campaigns in central Sahel

Jihadist organizations including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) have significantly expanded their influence across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Their strategy has evolved beyond traditional military confrontations to include deliberate economic disruption as a weapon of war.

In Mali, JNIM implemented a comprehensive fuel and transport embargo targeting cities in the Kayes and Nioro du Sahel regions. This blockade extended to key areas including Kayes, Sikasso, Koulikoro, Segou, and Mopti, severing critical trade routes that connect Bamako to surrounding regions. The resulting fuel shortages and price surges created economic paralysis, directly undermining government authority and destabilizing the military regime. Violence in Kayes, Sikasso, and Segou reached unprecedented levels, with monthly death tolls not seen since ACLED began tracking data in 1997.

Burkina Faso faced similar challenges as JNIM maintained relentless pressure on military forces and civilian defense groups. In May, the group briefly captured the provincial capitals of Djibo and Diapaga in rapid succession, demonstrating a significant leap in military capability. September brought one of the deadliest attacks to date when JNIM ambushed a military convoy near Koubel-Alpha in Soum province, resulting in approximately 90 soldier fatalities. These operations reveal JNIM’s growing tactical sophistication and its clear objective to weaken state institutions through sustained economic and military pressure.

economic warfare tactics spread to west african nations

While Niger hasn’t experienced the same scale of violence as its neighbors, the country is increasingly vulnerable to militant expansion. Militant activities have spread from traditional hotspots into southern Dosso and northern Agadez regions. ISSP has adopted similar economic warfare tactics, intensifying attacks on the critical Benin-Niger oil pipeline in the Dosso and Tahoua regions along the Nigerian border.

The kidnapping of an American citizen in Niamey on October 21 underscores the growing reach of militants, with urban centers once considered secure now falling within their operational radius. Both JNIM and ISSP have launched systematic kidnapping campaigns targeting foreigners, particularly in Mali and Niger. These operations serve dual purposes: generating revenue through ransom payments and creating an atmosphere of pervasive insecurity that discourages economic activity and foreign investment.

JNIM’s strategy primarily focuses on industrial facilities, mining operations, and transportation networks, while ISSP has expanded its targeting to include Western nationals and foreign laborers, with most abductions occurring in Niger. ACLED data also documents additional incidents in border regions of Burkina Faso and Algeria, indicating the expansion of militant operations across multiple countries.

new frontlines emerge in coastal west africa

A critical development for 2026 involves the consolidation of a new conflict frontline spanning the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands. This area has become strategically vital for both Sahelian and Nigerian militant factions, creating a dangerous intersection where previously separate conflicts are merging into a single interconnected battleground.

Throughout 2025, JNIM and ISSP significantly strengthened their presence in this tri-border region. Northern Benin experienced its deadliest year on record when JNIM launched cross-border operations from eastern Burkina Faso in April, culminating in the deaths of over 50 soldiers in Park W. By mid-year, the group had advanced further south into the Borgou department along the Nigerian border, marking a dramatic southward expansion beyond its traditional northern strongholds. JNIM claimed its first attack in Nigeria in late October, signaling the group’s determination to extend its operational reach beyond the Sahel.

Meanwhile, ISSP has reinforced its position in southwestern Niger, approaching the Benin border near Gaya, while continuing operations in Nigeria’s Sokoto and Kebbi states. In the Niger-Nigeria border areas, the group has targeted villages, security installations, and military patrols, while sabotaging critical infrastructure. Both militant organizations have now established footholds in northwestern and western Nigeria, creating a dangerous overlap between Sahelian and Nigerian extremist groups.

This convergence represents a turning point in regional security dynamics. The previously distinct Sahelian and Nigerian conflict theaters are gradually merging into a single, interconnected conflict environment stretching from Mali to western Nigeria. As militant groups expand their operations into shared territories, increased interaction and evolving violence patterns are likely to emerge across these borderlands in 2026.

sahelian military regimes face mounting challenges

The central Sahel’s military-led governments are confronting unprecedented internal and external pressures. In Mali and Burkina Faso, years of sustained JNIM offensives, blockades, and sieges have weakened state control and exposed fundamental structural vulnerabilities.

Mali’s ongoing fuel and transport embargo continues to devastate the economy, disrupting the movement of goods and people while intensifying civilian hardship. This economic strangulation undermines the regime’s legitimacy and risks deepening fractures within the armed forces, potentially triggering unrest that military leaders may struggle to contain. Burkina Faso faces similar challenges, with its army and civilian defense forces stretched to breaking point after years of sustained militant pressure.

JNIM’s temporary capture of major towns demonstrates both its strategic evolution and the state’s incapacity to defend regional capitals. The potential targeting of cities like Fada N’Gourma in eastern Burkina Faso highlights the growing threat to regional security. Continued military casualties and territorial losses could generate the same internal dissent and coup pressures that have toppled previous governments in the region.

state authority erodes as militant influence grows

Across the central Sahel, government control is steadily diminishing despite promises from military regimes to restore security. JNIM and ISSP now contest sovereignty over vast rural territories, where they enforce their own social and economic systems, tax local populations, and control access to essential livelihoods. Their influence is progressively encroaching on major population centers that were once considered relatively insulated from militant activities.

ISSP’s incursions into Ayorou and Tillaberi, along with operations in Niamey, demonstrate that no urban area can be considered safe from militant reach. Local self-defense groups, which have been central to government counter-insurgency efforts, are under unprecedented strain. In Mali, many traditional Dozo militias have either been disarmed or forced into agreements with JNIM, leaving communities dependent on militant-enforced security arrangements for basic protections and economic access.

In Burkina Faso, the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP)—once a cornerstone of the government’s mobilization strategy—has suffered heavy losses and remains primarily defensive. As these groups weaken, militant organizations are positioned to expand their territorial control and social influence further.

regional security partnerships show limited effectiveness

The Russian military partnership with Sahelian states has delivered mixed results. The transition from Wagner Group to Africa Corps operations left significant protection gaps, as the new force operates with more limited scope and capacity. However, toward year’s end, Africa Corps shifted its focus to securing critical fuel convoys and supply routes in southern Mali, particularly where JNIM’s embargo was beginning to lose momentum.

This military cooperation is likely to remain crucial in 2026, with Africa Corps providing essential logistical and aerial support to help military regimes maintain control over major transit routes and urban centers. Nevertheless, broader security challenges persist, and the fundamental issues of militant expansion and state fragility remain unresolved.

looking ahead: risks of political instability and regional fragmentation

The combination of sustained militant pressure, weakening local defense forces, and declining state capacity creates a high-risk environment for political destabilization in the central Sahel. If either the Malian or Burkinabe military regimes face internal divisions or popular unrest, a domino effect could threaten neighboring governments, placing them in increasingly precarious positions.

If current trends continue, 2026 may witness deeper political instability and territorial fragmentation throughout the central Sahel and along its southern borders. The merging of Sahelian and Nigerian militant theaters into a single conflict environment suggests that regional cooperation will face unprecedented challenges in addressing this evolving security crisis.