Over recent weeks, West Africa has seen a surge in initiatives aimed at rebuilding dialogue and consultation channels between CEDEAO member states and the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger). These delicate diplomatic moves centre on the security challenge and the need to implement common policies that harmonise actions, while working towards the holy grail of pooled resources. To give this urgent diplomacy every chance, the actors involved must observe a few unspoken requirements: sidestep the dispute over the three AES countries’ withdrawal from CEDEAO; bury the resentments fuelled by the AES regimes’ hostile communication campaigns against certain regional states; and move beyond the consequences of geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel, which have, among other effects, created a climate of cold war between the AES and CEDEAO. In short, it means silencing grievances, overcoming tensions and displays of misplaced pride, to face the common challenges of the hour.

Côte d’Ivoire ready to restart cooperation

One strong signal of this shift came from Ivorian Defence Minister Tene Birahima Ouattara. On 15 June, he declared he was sincerely ready to resume security cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, arguing that terrorism as it currently exists cannot be defeated by a single state. Collaboration and pooling of forces are essential, he said. This obvious point bears repeating at a time when some decision-makers warn that the consequences of the security crisis in the Sahel could become untenable for the entire region in the medium term.

How will Mali and Burkina Faso respond to Côte d’Ivoire’s call? For now, there is no sign of a collective surge of lucidity among all stakeholders to jointly produce solutions to the urgent problems. Even if Mali and Burkina Faso’s leaders acknowledge that breaking with CEDEAO does not preclude bilateral cooperation, a sudden change in their posture towards the Ivorian interlocutor is difficult. Regularly accused of hosting terrorist elements allegedly financed or sponsored by French imperialism, Côte d’Ivoire is a prime target in the AES’s construction of external — indeed imaginary — enemies. Though these accusations have never been backed by facts or proof, they form part of the doctrinaire narrative of regimes born from the coups that led to their withdrawal from CEDEAO. Yet despite these strained diplomatic relations, Côte d’Ivoire maintains discreet channels of exchange and cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, whose nationals enjoy refugee status by the thousands on Ivorian soil.

New era for Benin and Niger

Benin, also targeted by similar accusations, has seen its new president, Romuald Wadagni, undertake gestures of rapprochement and appeasement towards AES countries shortly after his inauguration on 24 May. A special mention goes to Niger, whose common border with Benin has remained closed since the aftermath of the July 2023 coup in Niamey. With all dialogue having become impossible between the two nations, the arrival of a new leader in Benin provided an opportunity to end what had turned into a vulgar personal quarrel between Nigerien military authorities and former Beninese President Patrice Talon.

The change of face at Benin’s presidency has thus acted as an accelerator for reconciliation between these two neighbours. In this spirit, a meeting of experts from Niger and Benin was held in Cotonou on 20-21 June to draft the terms of a new cooperation, focusing mainly on defence, security, and conditions for reopening the shared border — a decisive factor for resuming economic activity between Benin and Niger. On this last point, the Nigerien delegation stressed its desire for more information about the alleged presence of foreign elements at the Benin-Niger border. This request echoes the persistent suspicion from Niamey’s military government that Benin hosts a French military base intended to destabilise Niger or finance terrorism. Such an accusation defies common sense: why would Benin finance terrorism when it is itself a target and victim? In short, these statements are part of the routine narrative of AES regimes that struggle to stem the continuous deterioration of the security situation on their own territories. Their promise to unite military means to fight terrorism has not moved beyond rhetoric. Today, large swaths of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have become grey zones administered by armed terrorist groups, whose expansion and formidable project the ruling juntas cannot contain.

The hour has therefore come for reconciliation between Niger and Benin. According to Nigerien Interior and Security Minister Mohamed Toumba, a new era is opening for both countries. By choosing dialogue over confrontation, he said, we have created value for our economies and security for our populations. The Nigerien and Beninese actors are well aware that behind the security issue lies the equally crucial economic one, in a space where populations share intertwined destinies. As we witness a return to realist, pragmatic diplomacy, what is unfolding between Benin and Niger looks like a textbook case or a pilot event for a re-evaluated, intelligent management of shared vulnerabilities across the common West African space.

Endogenous responses to the security crisis

Initiatives aimed at normalising relations between CEDEAO and AES countries are expected to become even clearer in the coming months. Beyond reviving the neighbourhood logics that have prevailed in this region for decades, they underscore the urgency of endogenous answers to the security equation. This echoes recommendations made last year by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres for a resumption of dialogue among all West African countries. In December 2025, Russia, a privileged partner of the AES states, sent the first signals of a diplomatic recalibration in West Africa by calling for continued pragmatic, mutually beneficial dialogue between CEDEAO and the AES to find common solutions to shared challenges and threats, including the fight against regional terrorism. These remarks indicate a paradigm shift in international cooperation. In short, they remind Africans that it is up to them alone to craft the most efficient solutions to their current challenges.

Bilateral relational protocols are already observed between the AES and certain countries such as Ghana, Guinea, Togo and Senegal. Despite their withdrawal from CEDEAO, the Sahelian military regimes have maintained their presence in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and their nationals continue to benefit from the principle of free movement within the CEDEAO space. Ultimately, one will have to question the rationale behind the AES promoters’ withdrawal from the regional community. The only available answer points to the initial dispute: CEDEAO’s condemnation of the coups in AES countries, and above all, the refusal of these regimes to work towards restoring constitutional order. In many respects, the break between the AES and CEDEAO resembles an artificial or incomplete divorce.