A year has passed since the official charter and confederation establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Yet, the alliance frequently faces scrutiny regarding its core promise: mutual defense. In light of recent security escalations and significant jihadist attacks impacting Nigerien territory, the noticeable absence of a coordinated armed intervention has sparked questions among local populations and regional observers.
Several inherent structural and strategic factors contribute to this operational inertia on the ground in Niger.
Overstretched national armies
The primary constraint remains the overextension of national armed forces. Each member state of the alliance confronts intense security threats within its own borders:
- In Mali: The army and its allies maintain their focus on controlling the northern and central regions, battling the Joint Strategic Framework (JIM) and groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda.
- In Burkina Faso: More than half of the country’s territory endures constant pressure from persistent terrorist assaults.
- In Niger: Security forces must simultaneously secure the critical tri-border region (Liptako-Gourma) against the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), while also monitoring the Lake Chad basin.
Given these demanding circumstances, none of the three states possess sufficient strategic reserves to deploy a significant contingent to a neighboring country without compromising their own national security apparatus. This reality underscores the complex challenges facing Mali security and its partners.
Logistical hurdles for a joint force
While the political decision to unify forces was formalized during AES Confederation summits, the practical implementation of this joint force encounters substantial material obstacles:
- Interoperability and command: Harmonizing diverse military doctrines and establishing an integrated command chain demands considerable time and robust, secure transmission networks.
- Air support and intelligence: Projecting troops over vast distances in the Sahel necessitates extensive armored transport, resupply capabilities, and aerial intelligence assets (such as drones and fighter aircraft). These capacities are currently limited and heavily utilized for domestic operations.
The evolving role of external partners
The departure of traditional military forces, particularly France and the UN mission MINUSMA, prompted the three military regimes to pivot their partnerships towards Russia, notably through the deployment of the Africa Corps paramilitary group. However, these support forces are primarily deployed under bilateral agreements and are not principally tasked with conducting cross-border operations under the AES banner. This shift impacts the broader West Africa Mali security landscape.
A strategic emphasis on intelligence
Beyond large-scale troop deployment, AES authorities highlight an alternative form of cooperation: intelligence sharing and targeted operations along borders. For the Sahel’s military command, intervention does not always manifest as a visible, massive deployment but rather as coordinated actions within the tri-border area, where each army primarily operates from its own sovereign territory to enhance regional Sahel security alliance efforts.
