On the morning of 9 October 2026, heavy fighting broke out between the JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) in the Tessit area, along the border with Burkina Faso. The two rival organisations issued contradictory claims of victory, but the core issue is not who won the battle. It is why armed groups remain able to operate, move and fight in territories that the military authorities of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) insist they are securing.
What happened at Tessit
Sources close to the JNIM said the rival organisation suffered a heavy defeat on several fronts. Sources close to IS-S, meanwhile, claimed that the JNIM was defeated and that new areas had been seized.
These conflicting accounts do not establish the true outcome of the clashes. They do, however, point to a troubling reality: armed groups continue to contest territory across the Sahel while civilians remain exposed to insecurity, forced displacement and the wider consequences of this war.
The persistent presence of armed groups: a challenge the juntas can no longer ignore
The fighting highlights a major contradiction in the security narrative of the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which are united within the AES. Since taking power, the military authorities have made the recovery of sovereignty and the fight against terrorism central pillars of their legitimacy. Yet the continued presence of armed groups and their ability to move, organise and confront one another on the ground raises questions about how effective the strategies have been.
The problem is not only that terrorist groups exist. It is also the persistent difficulty states face in preventing them from establishing a lasting foothold on their territory. The Tessit clashes illustrate this: while the two organisations fight over positions, populations continue to bear the consequences of an insecurity that does not disappear despite repeated promises to restore order.
AES authorities regularly denounce foreign interference and, depending on the circumstances, accuse certain neighbouring countries of facilitating the activities of armed groups or of serving as rear bases for their fighters. Such accusations, however, must be examined against verifiable evidence. The presence of terrorist groups on a country’s territory does not by itself prove that its leaders support or willingly host them.
Yet an unavoidable question remains: how can military governments justify their security record when armed groups continue to operate in areas where the state struggles to restore lasting authority?
Between sovereignty rhetoric and realities on the ground
One of the main challenges for Sahelian military regimes is now to show that their strategic choices produce concrete results. The change of military partners, the departure of Western forces and the rapprochement with Russia were presented as ways to regain control of the security situation.
But these shifts alone are not enough to eliminate armed groups. Persistent difficulties in Mali and the violence affecting various regions of the Sahel are a reminder that counterterrorism also depends on intelligence, an effective administrative presence, the protection of civilians and the ability of security forces to hold reconquered territory.
A United Nations report published in 2026 described sustained activity by the JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, particularly in the Tessit and Ménaka areas of Mali, as well as in parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also noted clashes between these organisations over territorial control.
This reality weakens narratives that present security difficulties as the exclusive consequence of external manoeuvres. Regional and cross-border factors exist, but they do not absolve any government of responsibility for its own results.
The question of staying in power
Managing the terrorist threat also raises a broader political question: how can persistent insecurity be prevented from becoming a permanent argument for concentrating power and postponing a return to normal constitutional order?
It would be reckless to assert, without evidence, that AES leaders willingly host or sustain terrorist groups in order to stay in power. Such an accusation requires concrete, independent and verifiable elements.
It is legitimate, however, to question the political consequences of a situation in which the security threat remains omnipresent while military authorities continue to present the fight against terrorism as a major justification for their governance.
The distinction is fundamental: denouncing the possible political exploitation of insecurity is not the same as claiming that leaders themselves organise that insecurity. The first is political analysis; the second requires proof.
Populations want results, not just explanations
In Tessit, the opposing claims by the JNIM and the Islamic State do not yet make it possible to determine with certainty which group won the 9 October clashes. But this uncertainty does not change the main issue: these organisations remain capable of conducting operations and contesting control of certain areas.
For residents, the consequences are very real. Insecurity disrupts travel, hampers economic activities and complicates access to essential services. Talk of sovereignty, international alliances and external enemies cannot durably replace measurable results on the ground.
The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger therefore face a simple demand: demonstrate their ability to protect populations, prevent armed groups from establishing a lasting presence and restore an effective public presence in affected areas.
Sovereignty is not measured only by the partners a country chooses or the foreign forces it expels. It is also measured by a state’s ability to protect its citizens on its own territory.
As long as armed groups continue to contest territory in the Sahel, AES authorities will have to answer this question: beyond rhetoric and accusations directed abroad, what lasting results can they demonstrate to guarantee the security of populations?
By Kadi Alhassane — Journaliste / Rédacteur