A decisive turn after the failed coup
When a leader who seized power by force begins to fear being toppled in the same way, the political landscape shifts irreversibly. On 17 September, a decree signed by General Abdourahamane Tiani stripped five Nigeriens of their nationality on a provisional basis a move that marks a decisive turn in the junta’s posture. Among those targeted is former Prime Minister Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou, who served under Mohamed Bazoum, the president Tiani overthrew in July 2023. The decree lands in a climate of acute political and military tension, just weeks after an attempted putsch on 29 August, and it underscores a new momentum: the regime is no longer merely defending itself from outside threats. It is turning inward, against its own citizens and former officials.
From palace attack to a changed power equation
There are coincidences that speak volumes. On 26 July 2023, General Tiani took power after toppling Mohamed Bazoum. Three years later, on 29 August 2026, the man who had seized power by arms faced a reversal attempt of his own. This time, the shots did not come from outside. They came from within. The presidential palace was targeted. Air Base 101 was attacked. The public television station was stormed. For several hours, the balance of forces remained uncertain inside the military apparatus itself. Troops reportedly hesitated to take sides while mutineers sought to rally other officers. For a man who rose through a coup, the signal was brutal: the very scenario he had helped set in motion could now be turned against him.
The 29 August turning point
The attempted putsch did not overthrow Tiani. But it profoundly altered the equation of power. The junta reportedly had to rely on several hundred Russian Africa Corps troops to retake Air Base 101. At least 200 military personnel have been arrested since the events of 29 August, mainly from special forces. Then the chain of command began to shift. On 11 September, the chief of defence staff, General Moussa Salaou Barmou, was dismissed. Days later, four ministers were replaced. Officially, the changes are about reorganisation, fixing dysfunctions and securing the command structure. But in politics, timing matters and the timing tells a story: after being threatened, the regime is regrouping around those it deems most reliable.
The 17 September decree
On 17 September, another thunderbolt. Tiani signed a decree provisionally stripping five people of their Nigerien nationality. Among them: Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou, former prime minister under Mohamed Bazoum. The decree cites alleged offences including “intelligence with foreign powers”, dissemination of data likely to disturb public order, presumed participation in an effort to demoralise the army and the nation, and breaches of state security. It must be stressed: these are accusations and charges mentioned in the decree, not a final judicial conviction. But politically, the symbolism is heavy. Mahamadou is not just any opponent. He belongs to the former state apparatus. He served as prime minister under Bazoum, the president Tiani overthrew. And that is where the file takes on another dimension.
Bazoum is out of power, but his shadow lingers
Three years after the coup, former president Mohamed Bazoum remains a central figure in Niger’s political confrontation. His regime is gone. His institutions have been dismantled. But the men who served him continue to appear in the security and judicial files of the new authorities. With this new decree, five Nigeriens are now provisionally deprived of their nationality under a mechanism introduced in 2024. According to the Nigerien press agency, the total now stands at 25 people. A question arises: at what point does defending the state cease to be purely a security operation and become a political cleanup? The question deserves to be asked without presuming guilt or innocence of those targeted.
A power that sees enemies everywhere?
This is where the file becomes more troubling. Since 29 August, the Nigerien authorities have had to manage a threat that no longer comes only from armed groups or external adversaries. The threat can now, based on reported events, come from within the military apparatus itself. And when the loyalty of soldiers becomes a central question, the temptation can be strong to look for those responsible, for relays, for accomplices or for sponsors. The risk is then that suspicion becomes a method of government. A soldier replaced. A minister sidelined. Soldiers arrested. Former officials of the Bazoum regime targeted. And now, citizens provisionally stripped of their nationality. Taken separately, each act has its official justification. Put together, they paint the picture of a regime that, after being directly threatened, is seeking to regain control of all circles that could represent a vulnerability.
Tiani, the president who trusts no one?
This may be the most embarrassing question for the regime. How can a government last when a power born of a coup discovers that another coup can be applied to it? General Tiani now knows this mechanism from the inside. He knows that a military regime can seem firmly installed until the day a few officers decide to cross a line. 29 August demonstrated it. What was supposed to be impossible became possible. What was supposed to be unthinkable happened around the presidential palace. And when a regime discovers it can be overthrown by the same methods that brought it to the top, fear of the next plot can quickly become a political obsession.
“Niger is me”?
This is precisely where critics of the regime see a worrying drift. By deciding who is loyal, who is suspect, who must be arrested, who must be sidelined and now who can provisionally keep their nationality, Tiani gives his detractors the impression of a leader behaving as if he alone holds the keys to the Republic. As if Niger must be divided between those who support the regime and those who must be excluded from it. As if serving under Bazoum now constitutes a permanent political fault. As if any dissenting voice must necessarily hide a plot. General Tiani is obviously not Niger. But the concentration of decisions around his person fuels a fundamental question: how far can a regime go when, to protect itself, it ends up seeing threats behind every face?
The paradox of a power born from a putsch
Here lies the irony of this story. Tiani rose to the top after a coup. Today, he leads a regime that has itself just escaped an attempted putsch. And between those two dates, Niger seems to have tipped into a cycle where each crisis produces new purges, each suspicion calls for a new sanction and each attempt at contestation reinforces the concentration of power. The 17 September decree is therefore not merely a matter of nationality. It is a new episode in a broader battle: that of a regime seeking to eliminate zones of uncertainty around itself. One question remains, perhaps the most important: by fighting real or supposed plots, is Tiani building a system where any contestation automatically becomes a plot? If so, the problem would no longer be just knowing who wants to overthrow Tiani. It would also mean asking why a regime that claims to be firmly installed now seems so afraid of those around it. And above all, how far will this logic go? Because when a regime starts viewing its own citizens as potential threats, the line between protecting the state and protecting the regime becomes dangerously thin.
By Sidi Mohamed — Reporter
