Since the July 2023 military coup, Niger has experienced a sharp decline in human rights, with the junta intensifying repression against political opponents, dissidents, union members, and journalists. The military leadership continues to hold former President Mohamed Bazoum and his wife in arbitrary detention at the presidential palace in Niamey without access to family or legal counsel. Additionally, former government officials, journalists, and human rights activists remain incarcerated on politically motivated charges.
The country remains embroiled in a brutal conflict with multiple Islamist militant groups, including the Islamic State in the Sahel (EIS), the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM or JNIM)—linked to Al-Qaïda—as well as Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). Violence has escalated in the western Tillabéri region and along the borders with Mali and Burkina Faso, exposing civilians to heightened risks of violence, displacement, and extreme hardship.
In response to the insurgency, the junta launched a civilian militia program in August 2025 called Garkuwar Kassa (translated as “Shields of the Homeland” in Hausa), recruiting and training local volunteers to support the armed forces. While intended to bolster security, the initiative has sparked widespread concern over the potential for increased human rights violations by uncontrolled armed civilians.
Military consolidation of power and erosion of democracy
In March 2025, junta leader General Abdourahamane Tiani was sworn in as transitional president without holding elections, extending his grip on power and delaying any return to democratic rule. Days later, Tiani signed a decree abolishing multiparty politics nationwide, effectively silencing opposition voices and consolidating authoritarian control. This followed Niger’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2025—alongside Mali and Burkina FasoInternational Criminal Court (ICC), further jeopardizing accountability for atrocities and war crimes.
Islamist violence and civilian massacres in Tillabéri
The decade-long Islamist insurgency that began in northern Mali in 2012 has spread across the Sahel, inflicting widespread suffering on Niger’s civilian population. In 2025, the EIS escalated attacks in Tillabéri, near the borders with Burkina Faso and Mali, systematically targeting villages, mosques, and markets.
On March 21, 2025: militants stormed the village of Fambita during afternoon prayers, killing at least 46 worshippers—including three children—before setting fire to 20 homes and looting livestock and property. Survivors reported that military forces had failed to respond to prior warnings about the impending attack.
On May 13, 2025: gunmen raided Dani Fari, a small hamlet, killing five men and two boys, then burning at least 12 homes and plundering dozens more.
On June 20–23, 2025: a series of massacres unfolded across Tillabéri. On June 20, militants executed the 67-year-old village chief of Abarkaize and abducted five men. Their bodies were found three days later, with their throats slit. The same day, six civilians were killed in Ezzak, with homes looted and burned. On June 21, over 70 worshippers—including five children—were massacred during morning prayers in Manda; at least 10 homes were set ablaze.
Before each attack, militants threatened villagers, accusing them of collaborating with the Nigerien military or failing to comply with demands—particularly the payment of zakat (Islamic tax). Survivors emphasized that authorities had ignored repeated pleas for protection.
Systematic repression of dissent and civil society
Since the 2023 coup, the junta has intensified crackdowns on opposition figures, civil society leaders, and independent voices. Mohamed Bazoum and his wife remain detained without fair trial, despite a 2025 ruling by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention demanding their immediate release. The junta has also arrested dozens of former officials, activists, and journalists on dubious charges, with many held incommunicado for months.
Moussa Tiangari, a prominent human rights defender and vocal critic of the junta, was arrested in Niamey on December 3, 2024. Held initially at an undisclosed location, he was later transferred to the Central Service for Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime (SCLCT/CTO). In January 2025, he was charged with “criminal association linked to a terrorist enterprise” and “conspiracy against state authority in collaboration with enemy powers”—offenses that carry the death penalty. Despite a July 2025 court ruling rejecting his legal team’s appeal to dismiss the politically motivated case, Tiangari remains in pretrial detention without having appeared before a judge.
Crackdown on free press and independent media
Freedom of the press has been severely curtailed since the coup. Journalists face harassment, arbitrary arrests, and forced self-censorship. In January 2025, the Minister of Communication suspended Canal 3 TV for 30 days and revoked the press card of its editor-in-chief, Seyni Amadou, after a critical broadcast about government ministers. The suspension was later lifted, but the intimidation sent a chilling message to the media.
In February 2025, authorities ordered the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to leave Niger without explanation, disrupting critical humanitarian aid to vulnerable communities.
On May 8, 2025, security forces arrested three journalists from Sahara FM in Agadez, accusing them of reporting on alleged rifts in Niger’s security cooperation with Russia and Turkey. After a judge ordered their release the next day, they were rearrested and remain in detention.
In August, the Interior Minister, General Mohamed Toumba, dissolved four judicial unions, citing supposed deviations from their mandate and prioritization of “personal interests.” The move was condemned by the Union of Nigerien Workers and the Niger Bar Association, which called it a grave violation of labor rights and judicial independence. In protest, lawyers staged a two-day nationwide strike.
