The Malian transitional authorities remain unwavering in their commitment to combat armed groups. On April 25, jihadists from the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), linked to al-Qaeda, and Tuareg rebel factions from the National Liberation Front of Azawad (FLNA) launched coordinated attacks, resulting in the death of Defense Minister General Sadio Camara and the capture of Kidal. Since then, JNIM has imposed a blockade on Bamako and intensified assaults. Despite these challenges, the Malian army, alongside its Russian partners from the Africa Corps, continues operations with renewed determination.
Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, a prominent figure in the National Transitional Council (NTC)—Mali’s legislative body during the ongoing six-year transition—also leads the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA). The MSA is a politico-military group from the Ménaka region, allied with the transitional government, and actively collaborates with the Malian army and Russian forces in combating terrorism.
solidarity and resilience define malian leadership
Assimi Goïta remains the leader Mali needs
RFI: Since the attacks of April 25, critics argue the transitional government is weakened, while supporters urge unity. Do you believe Assimi Goïta remains the leader Mali requires?
Moussa Ag Acharatoumane: Absolutely. Assimi Goïta continues to lead Mali effectively. Despite the April 25 attacks, Mali stands strong and operational. Our defense and security forces successfully repelled terrorist actions, even as the assaults were complex and involved internal and external accomplices. Today, the Malian army is united, with a cohesive command structure. Soldiers on the frontlines maintain high morale, and operations are ongoing across the country.
The regime remains resilient despite ongoing armed group attacks and Bamako’s blockade.
The regime is not just resilient—it is the Malian people who are resilient. Malians deeply trust their army, their government, and their nation.
the dangers of jihadist alliances in northern Mali
What is your assessment of the JNIM-FLNA alliance on the ground?
Al-Qaeda’s influence is well-documented. Those who align with this group failed to learn from history. In 2012, a similar alliance emerged, leading to catastrophic consequences. Some of our brothers have tragically remained tied to al-Qaeda, while others, including high-ranking figures, have suffered devastating losses at its hands—even their families were decimated. It was al-Qaeda that orchestrated the assassination of Ghislain Dupont and Claude Verlon, RFI journalists killed in Kidal in 2013. One of the attack’s masterminds, Seidane Ag Hitta, now serves as a key leader within JNIM.
This alliance is a grave mistake. Our brothers must recognize the folly of their actions and reconsider. They should follow the MSA and Gatia’s example, who have allied with the Malian army to fight international terrorism.
FLNA leaders claim their alliance with JNIM is purely military, aimed only at combating the Malian army and Russia’s Africa Corps, with no broader shared agenda.
When al-Qaeda’s international media outlet acknowledges its alliance with FLNA, when Iyad Ag Ghali, JNIM’s leader, personally coordinates operations in Kidal alongside Alghabass Ag Intallah, a FLNA figurehead, and when they parade through Kidal’s streets under black flags symbolizing their extremist goals—this cannot be dismissed as mere military cooperation. Our brothers are mistaken. They fell victim to these forces in 2012, and the same actors persist in 2026.
military strategy in the adrar des ifoghas region
JNIM and FLNA now control Kidal and Tessalit, while the Malian army and Russia’s Africa Corps hold Aguelhoc and Anéfis. Should we expect a counteroffensive in the Kidal region?
Our defense and security forces are reorganizing and actively present in the Kidal region. They are determined to conduct operations across the entire national territory and will not surrender a single inch to terrorist organizations.
General El Hadj Ag Gamou, appointed as Kidal’s governor in 2023 and a close ally of yours, is reportedly stationed in Gao. Is this accurate? Could he play a role in a Kidal counteroffensive?
General El Hadj Ag Gamou is in excellent health and high spirits. As governor of the Kidal region, he oversees regional administration. The military’s operations, including offensives and redeployments, are handled by the army. His focus is on governance, and he is performing his duties exceptionally well.
security progress and ongoing threats in ménaka
In your region of Ménaka, the Malian army and Russia’s Africa Corps repelled Islamic State offensives in late April. What is the current situation in the city?
Ménaka is under control. Local administration has resumed normal operations, and our defense forces, along with their partners, conduct regular patrols. However, the threat remains. We must stay vigilant—we are at war with one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations. While calm prevails for now, vigilance is essential.
no dialogue with extremist groups, says malian leader
Dialogue and negotiation with JNIM and FLNA are advocated by opposition figures such as the Coalition of Republican Forces (CFR) led by Imam Dicko. Yet, for a decade, such dialogue has been a recurring theme in national consultations, including under the transitional government. Why do current authorities refuse to engage?
There can be no negotiations with groups whose sole objective is the destruction of our nation. The Malian state is duty-bound to protect its people and territorial integrity. Negotiation is only possible if these groups abandon their violent ideology and objectives. If they reconsider their stance, reconciliation may be possible—but not under the current conditions.
