Mali’s post-coup strategy: asserting sovereignty through new partnerships
Since the military takeovers in 2020 and 2021, Mali has undergone a significant political transformation under the leadership of Colonel Assimi Goïta. The new regime has promoted a strong sovereigntist narrative, positioning itself as a defender of national autonomy against external interference, particularly from former colonial power France. This discourse has resonated with many Malians frustrated by decades of instability and perceived foreign dominance in security and political affairs.
However, this shift has also led to a pragmatic realignment of international partnerships. Mali has distanced itself from traditional Western allies, notably France, while simultaneously cultivating new relationships with countries such as Russia and the United Arab Emirates. This strategy, framed as a move toward greater sovereignty, has yet to translate into meaningful improvements in security, governance, or economic development.
the transactional approach to sovereignty: promises without delivery
The Malian authorities have repeatedly pledged to combat corruption, restore security, and rebuild institutions. Yet tangible progress remains elusive. The transitional government has repeatedly delayed elections, citing technical reasons, and proposed extending the presidential term until 2030. These decisions have raised concerns about democratic backsliding. In May 2025, the regime took further steps to consolidate power by dissolving all political parties, banning their activities, and justifying these measures on grounds of preserving public order.
This transactional sovereigntist strategy—leveraging external partnerships selectively to maximize short-term regime security and material benefits—has not delivered the promised stability. Instead, it has deepened Mali’s entanglement in broader geopolitical rivalries, from the Ukraine war to Middle Eastern conflicts, exposing the country to external pressures without addressing its underlying vulnerabilities.
economic stagnation and deepening inequalities
Despite the political rhetoric, Mali’s socioeconomic conditions remain dire. The country ranks 188th out of 193 on the UN Human Development Index, placing it among the lowest in human development globally. Persistent corruption continues to undermine governance, with limited progress in institutional reform and visible signs of elite enrichment. Economic growth remains concentrated in urban centers, particularly Bamako, while rural and border regions suffer from neglect. The urban-rural income disparity in Mali stands at approximately 5.5%, compared to 2.7% in India, highlighting severe regional inequities.
This uneven development fuels public discontent and provides fertile ground for armed groups to exploit local grievances. Despite repeated pledges to eradicate terrorism and improve security, Mali remains trapped in a cycle of violence. Attacks, ambushes, and violent clashes persist across the country, with armed groups demonstrating increasing adaptability and using new technologies to enhance coordination and recruitment.
the limits of external partnerships in fragile states
Mali’s shifting alliances reflect a broader trend in fragile states: the pursuit of transactional sovereignty. The regime has sought to balance relationships with multiple external actors, including Russia and the United Arab Emirates, to secure security support, economic assistance, and political legitimacy. Yet these partnerships have not translated into sustainable stability.
Russia, through the Wagner Group and later the Africa Corps, has played a central role in Mali’s evolving security landscape. While Wagner’s involvement contributed to tactical gains—such as the recapture of Kidal in 2023—it also came with allegations of serious human rights abuses. The subsequent shift to the Africa Corps signaled a deeper consolidation of Russian influence, now embedded in formal bilateral defense agreements and expanding economic cooperation. However, this alignment has not addressed Mali’s broader security challenges or economic stagnation.
Other external actors, such as the United Arab Emirates, have also engaged with Mali despite publicly condemning military coups in the region. This pragmatic approach reflects a broader effort by Gulf states to expand their influence across the Sahel, competing with regional powers such as Algeria and Qatar. Meanwhile, the United States and Ukraine have indirectly influenced Mali’s trajectory through intelligence-sharing and technological support, further entangling the country in global rivalries.
The result is a precarious balancing act that sustains the regime in the short term but deepens Mali’s long-term risks. The country has become a secondary theater in wider strategic rivalries, where external actors prioritize short-term influence over lasting stabilization. This transactional engagement increases Mali’s vulnerability to external shocks and shifting geopolitical priorities.
a precarious future for Mali and the Sahel
Mali’s post-alignment strategy—grounded in transactional sovereignty—offers flexibility but not stability. While it may provide short-term resilience for the regime, it carries significant risks, including deepening dependency, fragmenting fragile security structures, and entrenching Mali’s role as a proxy in external interventions.
Absent meaningful reforms, Mali’s crisis is likely to persist and intensify. Instability may spill into neighboring states, particularly along the Gulf of Guinea. Durable stability will require a comprehensive transformation that rebuilds trust between the state and its citizens while mitigating the country’s exposure to external geopolitical and economic shocks. Without such reforms, Mali risks becoming a cautionary tale of how sovereigntist rhetoric, without substance or strategy, can perpetuate rather than resolve deep-seated crises.
