On April 25, 2026, a sweeping offensive was launched in Mali by the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM, Al-Qaeda’s Sahelian branch) and the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) against Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian partners, the Afrika Korps. The attack has triggered a severe security crisis, reigniting fears of a northern takeover—a scenario last seen in March 2012, though the political context has since shifted dramatically.

How does this offensive compare to the 2012 crisis? What short-term outcomes can be anticipated?

The current context: an unprecedented offensive

Five major Malian cities came under attack on April 25, 2026: Bamako, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti. This marks the first time since 2012 that jihadist and separatist factions have launched a joint operation of such scale. Their coordination, previously sporadic since 2024, has evolved into a concrete partnership, with attacks concentrated on FAMa and Russian positions. In Bamako, symbolic sites such as Kati’s military quarters and the airport were specifically targeted.

The situation remains fluid, but initial assessments reveal critical developments:

• The northern regions have fallen under rebel and jihadist control. Kidal, Tessalit, and Anéfis are now in their hands, along with Ber, Bourem, Gourma-Rharous, Léré, Intahaka, and Tessit—strategically encircling Tombouctou and Gao. Certain northern military bases, however, remain under FAMa-Russian control, including those in Gao, Tombouctou, and Aguelhok.
• The junta’s leadership has been dealt a severe blow. Defense Minister General Sadio Camara was killed, while several high-ranking officials, including General Modibo Koné, head of Mali’s National Security Agency, were injured. President Assimi Goïta, the junta leader, was reportedly evacuated to the Turkish embassy before reappearing publicly on April 28 alongside Russian officials.
• Rumors of an attempted coup by General Malick Diaw, a key junta figure, circulated but remain unconfirmed. One thing is clear: the military leadership has been severely shaken by the offensive.

While parallels can be drawn with 2012, key differences emerge:

• JNIM and FLA are now openly collaborating, with JNIM leadership allowing FLA spokespeople to take the lead. Unlike 2012, JNIM’s senior figures, including Iyad ag Ghali and Hamadoun Kouffa, have avoided public appearances—only Sidan Ag Hitta, a high-ranking JNIM cadre, was spotted in Tessalit.
• Instead of executing captured soldiers, as occurred in 2012, both groups prioritize negotiation and disarmament, offering safe passage to FAMa troops before encouraging further defections. They position themselves as protectors of both civilians and soldiers against Bamako’s junta.
• Negotiations with Russian mercenaries facilitated a controlled withdrawal from key northern bases, including Kidal, mirroring tactics observed in Syria. Algeria likely played a mediating role, potentially in coordination with the FLA.
• The northern conquest was enabled by a strategy to simultaneously pin down FAMa forces in central Mali and Bamako. The prolonged attack on Bamako itself is unprecedented.

An anticipated crisis

As early as September 2022, analysis highlighted the flaws in Mali’s Russian military partnership, warning that it would neither address security challenges nor sustain the junta’s position. The Russian presence, far from stabilizing the region, has instead alienated civilians and failed to curb JNIM’s expansion.

• In January 2023, a foresight exercise outlined scenarios that are now unfolding:
• Tensions between the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and FAMa/Russian forces would reignite armed clashes in the north, with the CMA allying with JNIM to regain control over the Niger River loop and potentially half the country.
• The central regions would fragment under relentless clashes between the Macina Katibat and community defense militias, eventually falling under JNIM’s de facto control.
• The capital would be encircled, though an outright occupation remains unlikely unless the army collapses completely.
• Loss of control over northern and central Mali would trigger political fractures, prompting negotiations with JNIM to secure a fragile truce. Pressure from Malian religious institutions would likely push the government toward dialogue.
• By November 2023, the recapture of Kidal by FAMa and Russian forces was dismissed as unsustainable. The CMA’s strategic retreat signaled preparations for a future counteroffensive, culminating in the recent conquests.

These insights confirm that the current crisis was not unforeseen. What, then, are the likely short-term developments?

Short-term prospects

Militarily, the JNIM-FLA coalition is likely to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian forces from the north before seizing Gao and Tombouctou, effectively partitioning Mali as it did in 2012. Historically, the fall of Kidal preceded coordinated assaults on Gao and Tombouctou, with mass desertions among Malian troops accelerating the collapse. With command structures in disarray and political instability gripping Bamako, FAMa’s defections are expected to continue.

The only factor that could delay a swift rebel takeover is the threat posed by Malian and Burkinabé TB2 drones. While the JNIM and FLA may target Malian drones, neutralizing Burkinabé or Nigerien drones presents a greater challenge.

The north is poised to fall under FLA and JNIM control, particularly as both groups have moderated their objectives. The FLA seeks de facto autonomy for the Azawad without pursuing full political independence, while the JNIM appears content with a less stringent application of Islamic law. This reduces the likelihood of a scenario akin to 2012, where jihadists violently seized cities and imposed harsh governance. Following their 2013 defeat at the hands of French forces, AQMI leaders advocated for a softer expansion strategy, emphasizing preaching over strict territorial control.

The capture of northern Mali would position the armed groups advantageously, but at a cost. They would face two additional fronts: countering the Islamic State in the Ménaka region and defending against aerial incursions by Malian and Burkinabé forces.

Unlike 2012, JNIM fighters are also active in central Mali, with new offensives likely against garrisons in cities like Gossi, Boni, Hombori, Niafunké, Konna, Mopti, and Sévaré. While the FLA may not support operations in the center, the JNIM’s goal appears to disrupt FAMa’s operations rather than occupy territory. Recent retaliatory attacks on villages like Kori-Kori and Gomossogou underscore the challenge of controlling rank-and-file fighters, whose actions sometimes clash with the coalition’s broader political strategy.

The fate of central and southern Mali is harder to predict. The JNIM has long controlled rural areas in the center, negotiating local agreements with communities in exchange for limited Islamic law enforcement—a strategy reminiscent of the Viet Cong or Taliban. However, unlike the Taliban, the JNIM lacks the manpower to sustain a dense territorial occupation.

The 2012 capture of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou enabled jihadist groups to recruit heavily in central communities. If this pattern repeats, the JNIM could significantly strengthen its ranks.

Unless forced into negotiations, the junta has little incentive to abandon its Russian partnership if it hopes to survive. Continued financial support could secure Russian protection around Bamako, but territorial ambitions appear increasingly unlikely. If Russia withdraws, Mali would rely on limited support from Burkina Faso and Niger, themselves embroiled in jihadist conflicts. Senegal may mobilize at its border but is unlikely to deploy troops amid its own security concerns. Algeria, Mauritania, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire are poised to observe, privately welcoming the junta’s humiliation while pushing for negotiations.

Prospectively:

• The fall of the north and loss of central Mali are inevitable, though the timeline remains uncertain.
• The Russian partnership and Bamako’s military strategy are unsustainable, as recent events have demonstrated.
• Two potential turning points could emerge:
• A negotiated settlement, driven by the junta’s collapse or international pressure.
• A foreign military intervention to reverse the balance of power, though this remains improbable.

What lies ahead for Mali and the international community?

Several scenarios, not mutually exclusive, are likely to unfold:

Scenario 1: Prospects for a foreign military intervention

Scenario 2: Prospects for a comprehensive political negotiation

Since 2025, JNIM leaders have sought to replicate the HTS model in Syria, embracing a nationalist approach, limited Islamic governance, and engagement with the international community. To achieve this, they have sought a sponsor since 2024, with Algeria or Mauritania as potential candidates. Both countries maintain close ties with FLA leaders, engage with JNIM cadres, and oppose Bamako’s junta—though neither has confirmed a willingness to play this role.

This strategy anticipates a collapse of the junta, followed by negotiations with a political force willing to accommodate their demands: the application of Islamic law nationwide, greater autonomy for the north and center, and local governance roles for JNIM and FLA.

A critical obstacle persists: unlike HTS, JNIM has not severed its allegiance to Al-Qaeda, nor has it abandoned its ambition to export jihadist ideology beyond Mali’s borders. Additionally, JNIM’s lack of official dialogue with the international community complicates efforts to normalize its status. It remains unclear whether JNIM can be an acceptable negotiating partner for regional powers or European stakeholders. The political framework for such negotiations does not currently exist.

A comprehensive political negotiation would require engaging both the FLA—building on the Algiers Accords—and the JNIM, leveraging local agreements with the High Islamic Council of Mali.

Progress hinges on pressure from Russian, Turkish, or African partners (Togo, Ghana) against the junta. With no negotiations in sight, the strangulation strategy will persist, and captured cities will serve as launching pads for further attacks on FAMa.