The security landscape in Mali has worsened significantly since late April 2026, marked by coordinated attacks that targeted multiple cities and resulted in the tragic deaths of the Defense Minister, Sadio Camara, along with numerous Malian soldiers.
These incidents are part of a worrying surge in violence against the army and state institutions that has escalated over recent years. Our decade-long research on insecurity and politics in West Africa and the Sahel highlights that the root causes of these attacks stem from unaddressed grievances among the Touareg communities—nomadic Berber groups in northern Mali—who have long felt sidelined by the current military regime.
The primary driver of this unrest is the government’s failure or unwillingness to address the Touareg’s core demands, which include political autonomy, cultural recognition, equitable resource distribution, and security concerns. These communities have historically raised issues about marginalization, resource control, and what they perceive as state neglect.
The second key factor is the military’s heavy-handed approach to rebel groups in the north, which has led to significant civilian casualties. The Touareg have long opposed the successive governments’ militarization policies, viewing them as oppressive rather than constructive.
The third issue is the unequal distribution of resources, particularly in northern Mali. Critical assets like gold deposits, salt mines, grazing lands, and strategic trade corridors remain under the control of the southern-based central government, leaving the north economically marginalized.
Addressing economic marginalization could yield multiple benefits: easing Touareg grievances, restoring trust in the Malian state, and shifting the conflict’s focus from rebellion to inclusive governance, stability, and sustainable peace in northern Mali.
Current dynamics
In April 2026, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) joined forces with the Tuareg rebel Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA) to launch coordinated attacks across multiple Malian cities. This mirrors a similar offensive in 2012, when Touareg militants and affiliates of Al-Qaeda launched a rebellion against the state. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a predominantly Touareg separatist group founded in 2011, attempted to secede and triggered a prolonged conflict.
The MNLA, initially numbering around 10,000 fighters at its peak in 2012, lacked the military strength to hold territory. It later allied with Islamist factions like Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). However, the alliance collapsed after these groups, better armed and financed, expelled the secular separatists from major cities such as Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. A French military intervention in 2013 helped the Malian government regain lost territories, pushing AQMI and its allies into remote mountainous and desert regions, where they adopted guerrilla tactics like suicide bombings and landmine use.
The withdrawal of French forces in 2022 reduced counterterrorism pressure, disrupted intelligence and logistics, and created a security vacuum in a country with weak state capacities. This emboldened Islamist groups, enabling them to expand operations, recruit locally, and regain territorial influence.
Unresolved issues
The military regime under Assimi Goïta has failed to address the Touareg’s long-standing demands for representation and autonomy. Since Mali’s independence in 1960, Touareg leaders have argued that the country’s governance structure does not reflect their political identity, economic interests, or traditional governance systems. Demands for autonomy or self-rule have repeatedly been met with repression.
Additionally, climate change-induced challenges such as drought, desertification, and erratic rainfall have devastated the livelihoods of pastoralist Touareg communities. These grievances predate the Islamist insurgency and remain central to understanding the group’s motivations.
A second unresolved issue is the reliance on military force in counterterrorism operations, which has led to severe civilian harm. Reports indicate that operations in northern and central Mali have resulted in mass displacements, arbitrary arrests, and collective punishments, creating fertile ground for Islamist recruitment and territorial control.
These failures have been attributed to successive Malian regimes and past French interventions, contributing to the perception of their ineffectiveness in stabilizing the region.
The third major driver of violence is the unequal distribution of resources. Since independence, public investment, infrastructure, social services, and political attention have overwhelmingly favored southern Mali, leaving the north economically stagnant. Previous peace agreements promised decentralization and integration of northern elites and ex-combatants, but implementation has been slow or nonexistent.
Is there a path forward?
Resolving the Touareg question is essential to reducing tensions and fostering national cohesion. While Touareg actors have twice miscalculated by aligning with jihadist groups, this does not negate the need to address the structural inequalities and long-standing grievances that fuel their demands.
To achieve this, Mali could draw inspiration from the model implemented by former Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou. Before his presidency, Niger’s Touareg communities faced similar marginalization. Upon taking office in 2011, Issoufou:
Integrated Touareg elites and former rebels into state institutions;
Decentralized authority by granting regional administrative and budgetary control;
Launched disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to facilitate peacebuilding.
Issoufou also invested in infrastructure projects tailored to Touareg needs, including pastoralism support, education, and livelihood programs. Initiatives to improve water access in arid pastoral zones, enhance road connectivity, and strengthen security were prioritized. Such measures could serve as a blueprint for Mali to address Touareg grievances and restore stability.
