President Emmanuel Macron has adopted a resolute tone to characterize the evolving relationship between France and the military administrations across the Sahel. By stating that Paris was repaid with “ingratitude,” the French head of state unequivocally acknowledged the conclusion of a diplomatic era that spanned over a decade, using language rarely this direct. This declaration is clearly aimed at the ruling juntas in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey – three capitals that have successively informed France of the termination of bilateral military cooperation.
Presidential remarks signal a definitive sahelian rupture
The forceful rhetoric emanating from the Élysée Palace stands in stark contrast to the usual diplomatic caution exercised when engaging with African partners. By emphasizing France’s substantial contributions, marked by significant human and financial sacrifices, Emmanuel Macron seeks to place the responsibility for this diplomatic breakdown squarely on the transitional authorities that emerged from the coups in 2020, 2022, and 2023. This discourse also targets a domestic audience, as the developments in the Sahel are frequently perceived in France as a major strategic setback, particularly following the enforced withdrawal of Operation Barkhane in 2022.
Nevertheless, the President’s choice of words risks exacerbating an already precarious situation. In both Bamako and Niamey, the official narrative has been built upon condemning a French presence deemed intrusive, even neo-colonial. Each grievance-laden statement from the Élysée inevitably fuels the sovereignist rhetoric championed by Colonels Assimi Goïta, Ibrahim Traoré, and Abdourahamane Tiani. European diplomatic missions, closely monitoring these events, are concerned that such explicit language could further complicate their own remaining channels of communication with Sahelian capitals.
The alliance of Sahel states and the french withdrawal
Since the establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023, which transitioned into a confederation in July 2024, the three military regimes have rapidly accelerated their diplomatic reorientation. This includes their departure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a growing alignment with Moscow through the Africa Corps (succeeding Wagner), and outreach to Ankara and Tehran. The geopolitical repositioning of Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey is proceeding at an accelerated pace. France, which historically maintained significant economic influence through the CFA franc, Orange, TotalEnergies, and Eramet, now sees its levers diminishing.
Concretely, the anticipated departure of the last French troops from Chad and Senegal by the end of 2024 completes Paris’s military disengagement from the Sahelo-Saharan region. The French presence in West Africa, which numbered over 5,000 personnel in 2020, is now reduced to a residual footprint, primarily focused on training and intelligence. This contraction profoundly reshapes France’s influence model, which has long relied on projecting military force.
A double-edged rhetoric for Paris
By publicly citing the ingratitude of its African partners, Emmanuel Macron risks reinforcing a postcolonial interpretation that has already resonated widely among Sahelian public opinion, particularly within urban and youth demographics. Whether intended or not, the term evokes a paternalistic narrative that the French executive had previously sought to dismantle since the Ouagadougou speech in November 2017. The stark contrast between initial promises of a renewed Franco-African relationship and the current reality of a rupture is now undeniable.
Furthermore, the presidential statement comes at a time when Paris is endeavoring to rebuild its African partnerships around states considered more stable, from Morocco to Côte d’Ivoire, including Bénin and Mauritania. This strategy of bypassing the Sahel necessitates cautious public communication, lest it contaminate the entire spectrum of diplomatic relations. Several African diplomats, even from allied nations, privately express discomfort with what they perceive as an overly personal register.
In Dakar, Abidjan, and Nouakchott, these developments are being closely watched, as they highlight France’s difficulty in cleanly concluding one chapter without reopening old wounds. The fundamental question remains: how can Paris restore its credibility for listening on the continent while acknowledging a Sahelian outcome it believes has been unfairly received?
