The once thriving Sambisa forest in northeastern Nigeria now stands as a battleground where two militant factions vie for dominance. Covering 60,000 square kilometers, this dense woodland—once a haven for wildlife and tourists—has transformed into a strategic stronghold where survival, territory, and influence are fiercely contested.
Since Boko Haram’s 2009 insurgency began, its splintering in 2016 created two distinct groups: the Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP). Today, these factions engage in relentless clashes over Sambisa, leveraging its impenetrable terrain to launch attacks and control smuggling routes. Military operations by Nigerian forces and regional coalitions have intensified, yet the forest remains a contested prize.
Security analyst Zagazola Makama, based in Borno, reports frequent skirmishes within and around Sambisa, with both sides claiming heavy casualties. While unverified, these claims underscore the escalating rivalry—a conflict that now runs parallel to their broader insurgency against state forces.
Analysts warn that the rivalry may weaken both groups, creating opportunities for counter-terrorism efforts. Malik Samuel, a senior researcher at Good Governance Africa, notes that despite their rivalry, both factions have adapted remarkably, retaining operational capacity against Nigerian troops and the Multinational Joint Task Force.
Strategic advantages and shifting dynamics
The Sambisa forest’s rugged terrain and thick canopy provide ideal cover for militant hideouts, making it a critical base for attacks. While JAS is notorious for abductions, looting, and indiscriminate violence, ISWAP prioritizes territorial control, taxation, and establishing shadow governance—despite its brutal disregard for civilian life.
According to Taiwo Adebayo, a Boko Haram specialist at the Institute for African Security Studies, the Nigerian military’s focus on ISWAP’s attacks on military installations has inadvertently allowed JAS to regroup in Sambisa. He emphasizes the need for security strategies that treat JAS as an independent threat rather than a weakened rival.
An impasse with no clear resolution
Samuel predicts a prolonged stalemate between the two factions. ISWAP struggles to penetrate JAS’s stronghold in Barwa, where its leader is based, while their proximity in the Lake Chad islands ensures inevitable confrontations over territory and resources. However, outside these islands, JAS lacks the manpower, territorial reach, and experience of ISWAP, which is bolstered by foreign fighters.
