On April 20, 2026, General Évariste Ndayishimiye undertook an official “friendship and working” visit to Ouagadougou. At the time, the Burundian head of state was serving as the acting chairperson of the African Union (AU).
This diplomatic endeavor aimed to re-establish dialogue between the continental organization and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This alliance, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, is currently chaired by Captain Ibrahim Traoré.
The initiative unfolded amid the withdrawal of AES member states from AU bodies. In this context, the Burundian president traveled to Burkina Faso, a nation led by a military coup regime, to commend its efforts in restoring security and stabilizing the country, despite its leader publicly stating that democracy was no longer relevant. These developments are crucial for understanding contemporary Mali politics and regional dynamics in West Africa Mali.
Beyond the diplomatic rhetoric of “dialogue” and “stability,” could this signify a deeper solidarity among authoritarian regimes, united by their rejection of constitutional constraints?
My doctoral research delves into international sanctions (from the European Union and regional organizations) and authoritarian resilience within fragile states, with a comparative study focusing on Burundi. I dedicate a chapter to other sanctioned nations, notably Mali and Niger. Here, I analyze the political resources that Mali and Burundi leverage to withstand external pressures.
Shared trajectories of authoritarian rule
Indeed, it is important to acknowledge the convergence of institutional trajectories linking Burundi with the AES states. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have faced sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the European Union (EU) following coups that occurred in 2020 and 2021 in Mali, 2022 in Burkina Faso, and 2023 in Niger. These events significantly shaped Mali security and governance.
Burundi itself was sanctioned by the EU and the United States in 2016, a response to President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to seek a third term deemed unconstitutional. Certain political phenomena specifically call for a trans-regional comparative approach. This approach aims not merely to identify superficial resemblances but to highlight profound, convergent logics at play.
The rapprochement between Burundi and Mali, for instance—two countries separated by thousands of kilometers and operating in distinct geopolitical environments—exemplifies such an approach.
The strategy of designating an adversary
In both cases, the identification of an enemy, whether internal or external, serves as a central mechanism for legitimacy and a powerful driver of internal cohesion. This strategy allows for the constant reactivation of a perceived threat, adapting to political circumstances—be it a colonial adversary, a regional rival, or a diffuse security menace.
In Mali, this mechanism manifested with heightened intensity in early 2022. Fueled by a “rally ’round the flag” effect, where the populace unifies behind leaders in the face of an external or perceived threat, the Malian government saw its authority strengthened. This period was critical for Mali politics.
Now supported by a civilian component in the second iteration of the transition following the May 2021 putsch, the military leadership then garnered massive popular backing.
Tens of thousands of demonstrators converged on Boulevard de l’Indépendance on January 14, 2022, to denounce the economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS. They chanted their hostility towards Paris and the regional organization, accusing them of interfering in the nation’s affairs. They also demanded a Mali dedicated solely to its citizens and free from external influences.
In Burundi, it is Belgium that crystallizes the anger of supporters of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), the ruling party. Designated as historically responsible for ethnic divisions within the country, the former colonial power is also accused of complicity with Rwanda in attempts to destabilize the incumbent regime.
The Burundian government, led by the CNDD-FDD, portrays Brussels as the instigator of economic sanctions imposed by the EU—a rhetoric that enables both regimes to divert international criticism into a narrative of resistance against the former colonizer.
Selecting a regional rival
At the regional level, each regime also strategically chooses an adversary. In Mali, Algeria is accused of harboring certain opposition figures, such as Imam Mahmoud Dicko, and of colluding with terrorist groups active in the country. The Malian junta announced the “immediate end” of the Algiers peace agreement on January 25, 2024. This move profoundly impacted Mali security and diplomacy.
Mali also closed its airspace to Algeria, following a similar measure taken by the latter in April 2025. In Burundi, conversely, Paul Kagame’s Rwanda, a Tutsi-led regime, fulfills this adversarial role.
Labeled a “bad neighbor” by President Ndayishimiye, Kigali is accused of having sheltered the plotters involved in the 2015 coup attempt. Rwanda is also presented by Burundian authorities as a supporter of rebel movements such as RED-Tabara, sometimes associated with other armed groups in the region.
This defensive posture led to the closure of land borders with Rwanda in January 2024, as well as active military intervention in eastern DRC between August 2022 and December 2025. This intervention aimed to support the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), alongside Wazalendo militias (patriots in Kiswahili) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), against the March 23 Movement (M23), which Kigali reportedly backed.
These symbolic resources are mobilized to sustain a perpetual sense of siege—a necessary condition for the political survival of regimes that have transformed external threats into their primary fuel.
Security paradoxes
However, a security contradiction emerges between the two countries. In Mali, the threat appears more immediate through the attacks perpetrated by the FLA and the JNIM on April 25, 2026. These assaults contribute to bolstering the credibility of the regime’s security narrative.
This divergence in the nature of the threat gives rise to distinct legitimization strategies.
The leader of the junta in Mali, Assimi Goïta, has effectively circumvented electoral constraints. In July 2025, the National Transition Council granted him a renewable five-year mandate without elections and without term limits, completing a political drift that began with the initial postponements of the vote promised for March 2024. This is a key aspect of current Mali politics.
The junta no longer needs to legitimize a vote; instead, it positions itself as the sole bulwark capable of defeating the JNIM and the FLA. This narrative persists even as the Malian economy, though resilient, remains exposed to recurrent electricity outages and the gradual withdrawal of development and humanitarian aid.
In Burundi, the CNDD-FDD has endorsed the incumbent president as its candidate for the 2027 presidential election, and the ballot, even if controlled, remains an obligatory step.
The security record highlighted by Gitega therefore does not replace an election; rather, it aims to prepare for it. This is done within a context where the security narrative allows the regime to relegate to the background an economic performance marked by fuel and currency shortages that have affected the country since 2015.
Considered among the world’s poorest nations—with Burundi occupying the last place in 2023—does the constant externalization of responsibility through the perpetual construction of an enemy also mask internal predatory dynamics that structure authoritarian regimes, as analyzed by French political scientist Jean-François Bayart?
Ultimately, the comparison between Mali and Burundi reveals less about the singularity of each trajectory and more about the robustness of a common logic shared by regimes that have transformed their adversaries not into burdens, but into their very foundation for power.
