The central region of Mali experienced a surge in violence on Sunday, July 19, as the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) launched a series of coordinated assaults targeting state forces and their allies. The attacks, simultaneously executed in four locations, underscore the group’s growing operational capacity and the persistent inability of national and international forces to curb insurgent activity.
Mopti under siege: JNIM’s tactical escalation
In a statement released through its propaganda channels, JNIM claimed responsibility for four distinct operations in the Mopti region, each designed to disrupt military logistics and weaken local defenses. In the Douentza district, the group detonated three improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting a supply convoy, a military truck, and a motorcycle detachment carrying Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries from Africa Corps. Further west, near Kansila, JNIM engaged in direct combat with local Dozo hunters, a traditional militia often deployed by Bamako as auxiliary forces. Preliminary reports indicate three Dozo fighters were killed in the confrontation.
Five years of junta rule: promises unmet, violence unabated
The Assimi Goïta-led administration seized power in 2019 under the banner of restoring peace and reclaiming lost territory. Yet independent conflict analysis reveals a starkly different reality. Violence has not only persisted but escalated, with fatalities from political and terrorist violence doubling or tripling in key provinces compared to pre-coup levels. The rise of Africa Corps and its aggressive tactics have intensified intercommunal tensions, inadvertently fueling recruitment for armed groups. Additionally, the frequency of ambushes and IED strikes—such as those on July 19—has become a daily occurrence, paralyzing critical roadways and further destabilizing the region.
State retreat and humanitarian collapse
Despite official narratives celebrating military gains, the ground truth in Mali tells a different story. While symbolic victories, like the recapture of Kidal in late 2023, have been achieved, they have not translated into sustainable control. Vast swaths of the country, particularly in the north and center, remain lawless, with public services entirely absent. The United Nations reports over 400,000 internally displaced persons, as families flee both jihadist atrocities and the collateral damage of military operations.
The blockade imposed by JNIM and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has plunged entire communities into acute food insecurity. The inability to secure key routes has severed humanitarian supply lines, turning a security crisis into a silent humanitarian disaster.
Africa Corps: a partner failing on all fronts
The Malian junta’s pivot toward Moscow, first through Wagner Group and now Africa Corps—a unit directly linked to Russia’s defense ministry—has yielded little in terms of security. Tactically, Africa Corps has proven ineffective, suffering consistent losses and lacking the manpower to conduct meaningful counterinsurgency operations across Mali’s vast terrain. Strategically, the group’s heavy-handed tactics have alienated local populations, with documented abuses—such as those in Moura—pushing civilians toward insurgent groups that position themselves as protectors.
The air power paradox: fragility in the skies
Faced with a critical shortage of ground troops, Bamako has invested heavily in aerial capabilities, procuring drones and attack helicopters from Russia and Turkey. While these assets initially allowed for large-scale strikes, their effectiveness is now waning. Maintenance challenges, exacerbated by logistical bottlenecks and unreliable supply chains for spare parts, have grounded a growing number of aircraft. The L-39 Albatros jets and Mi-24 helicopters lost to technical failures or enemy fire highlight the fragility of this approach. Meanwhile, insurgents have adapted, operating in smaller units and blending into civilian areas to evade airstrikes, rendering precision nearly impossible.
A military-only strategy on the brink of failure
The July 19 attacks are not isolated incidents but symptoms of a systemic crisis. The junta’s militarized-only approach has reached its limits, failing to address root causes of instability. By severing diplomatic ties, alienating regional partners, and entrusting security to Russian mercenaries with competing interests, Bamako has trapped itself in a deadlock. Without a comprehensive political strategy that prioritizes governance, public service restoration, and civilian protection, Mali risks further territorial fragmentation under the relentless pressure of an expanding Sahelian jihadism.
