Since the July 2023 coup d’état, Niger has dramatically severed ties with Orano, the French nuclear giant that once monopolized its uranium for over half a century. The government’s nationalization of Somaïr, the revocation of the Imouraren mining license, and the country’s pivot toward Russia and China—along with renewed Western investor interest—have reshaped Niger’s uranium landscape. Yet beneath the nationalist headlines lies a stark reality: Niamey’s bold maneuvers have fueled a heated public debate—one that questions whether the country is truly securing better terms. With little transparent data to back up claims of improved deals, the fallout from this strategic gamble raises more questions than it answers.
From France to global suppliers: the painful cost of breaking from Orano
The separation from Orano wasn’t just political—it was industrial and financial. By December 2024, Orano had lost operational control of its Niger operations. Then, on June 19, 2025, Niger’s government nationalized Somaïr, the historic uranium mine in Arlit. Orano, which had held 63.4% of Somaïr, responded with international arbitration, arguing that the takeover violated existing agreements.
But reclaiming control of a mine doesn’t equate to reclaiming a market. Niger’s uranium output has plummeted over the past decade—from 4,116 tonnes in 2015 to just 962 tonnes in 2024. With only one active mine and multiple stalled projects, the country’s production capacity remains alarmingly weak.
In short, Niger has gained sovereignty over its uranium, but lost crucial industrial and commercial leverage. Without consistent production, Niamey’s bargaining power weakens—and the nation risks trading one dependency for another: market dependence.
The uranium price myth: why Orano wasn’t the problem
Contrary to popular belief, the price of uranium isn’t dictated by a single global exchange, like oil or gold. It’s negotiated privately, between producers and utilities, with contracts often tied to long-term formulas blending spot prices and fixed terms.
Historical data sheds light on past earnings. In 2020, Niger reportedly earned 48.1 billion CFA francs from Cominak (1,113 tonnes) and 103.3 billion CFA francs from Somaïr (1,879 tonnes). Somaïr’s revenue translated to roughly €83.75 per kilogram—equivalent to about $38 per pound—based on public disclosures. Other reports suggested Orano sold uranium at around 45,000 CFA/kg (~$33/lb), while some European or Japanese buyers reportedly paid up to 60,000 CFA/kg (~$43/lb).
Today, the market has shifted dramatically. In 2025, European utilities paid an average spot price of $70.33/lb (up from $53.59/lb in 2024), while long-term contracts averaged $54.70/lb. By late September 2026, spot prices soared to $89.63/lb, with long-term contracts nearing $96.50/lb. The numbers tell a clear story: the global uranium market is booming.
But that doesn’t mean Niger is selling its uranium at today’s highest prices. Its revenue depends on the terms of individual contracts—terms that remain shrouded in secrecy.
The Russian deal that never was—and the $170 million mystery
One of the most contentious episodes involves a reported deal with Russia. In 2025, French media claimed Niger had struck a secret agreement with Rosatom’s Uranium One Group to sell 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake for $170 million—a figure suggesting a price of $170/kg, or about $77/lb. That’s below the 2026 spot price, but comparable to some international contract levels at the time.
Neither Niamey nor Rosatom has ever confirmed the deal. The Nigerien government denied selling any stock, while Rosatom stated it wasn’t party to the alleged agreement. Yet, the allegation is hard to dismiss entirely.
In November 2025, a convoy of roughly 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake from Arlit traveled under military escort to Niamey. The shipment was eventually halted at the capital’s airport. While this doesn’t prove a sale took place, it signals active efforts to monetize stockpiles—efforts that remain officially unacknowledged.
Iran’s shadow negotiations: deals that almost happened
Russia isn’t the only actor lurking in the shadows. In 2024, reports surfaced of confidential talks between Niger and Iran regarding 300 tonnes of yellowcake, valued at around $56 million. Western and Nigerien sources confirmed negotiations had occurred. Yet Niamey denied any sale, with a senior advisor claiming Iran had proposed the purchase but was turned down due to insufficient stock.
Here again, the distinction must be made between negotiations, agreement, and execution. The evidence suggests talks took place—but no confirmed delivery or contract has been verified.
Russia and China: partners or bargainers?
Among modern alliances, Russia stands out as the most visible partner in Niger’s nuclear sector. In December 2025, Niger’s state-owned Timersoi National Uranium Company signed a cooperation deal with Uranium One Group, a Rosatom subsidiary, to jointly explore and develop new uranium deposits.
China has also shown strong interest, with 2025 reports suggesting potential deals for up to 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake. Yet, like Russia, Beijing offers no guarantee of better prices—only additional negotiation options for Niamey.
Diversification brings choice. But choice alone doesn’t translate to revenue. Without transparency, even favorable market conditions can fail to benefit the nation’s people or economy.
Is Niger making more from its uranium now?
At this stage, the honest answer is still: we don’t know. Niger now enjoys three strategic advantages it lacked before:
- Soaring global uranium prices—spot and long-term contracts are at their highest in years;
- Expanded partnership options—from Russia and China to Canada, Australia, and the U.S.;
- Greater control—over mining operations and export decisions.
Yet powerful constraints persist:
- Production collapse—from over 4,000 tonnes a decade ago to under 1,000;
- Logistical bottlenecks—mining, transport, and export challenges;
- Legal uncertainty—arbitration disputes with Orano could freeze uranium sales pending rulings.
In September 2025, a CIRDI tribunal ordered Niger not to sell or transfer uranium tied to the Somaïr dispute—further complicating market access.
What’s next for Niamey’s uranium gamble?
Niger’s strategy isn’t just about replacing France with new partners. It’s about turning uranium into a geopolitical lever. In 2026, the country launched the Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company to revive production and regain autonomy.
Meanwhile, Western investors are cautiously returning. In September 2026, the U.S. approved a $414 million loan for the Dasa uranium project, led by Canadian company Global Atomic. It’s a tentative step toward rebuilding trust and stability.
The real turning point may not be which country buys Niger’s uranium—but whether Niger can finally secure contracts that reflect its strategic value. For now, the debate rages: more partners, yes. Higher prices? Not yet proven. More transparency? Still a distant hope.
The nation’s most valuable resource remains trapped in a cycle of opacity and uncertainty—soaring on paper, but still waiting to land in the real economy.