As Niamey steadfastly maintains its border closure with Bénin, citing demands for robust security assurances, a complex question emerges for Niger following the renewed cooperation between Chad and France. If the presence of French military forces in a neighboring state is deemed a sufficient threat to justify closing a border, should this same principle logically extend to Chad?
The border separating Niger and Bénin remains shut. Nearly three years after the July 2023 coup d’état, the much-anticipated normalization between Niamey and Cotonou has yet to culminate in the effective reopening of this vital communication artery.
Despite this, recent months have seen a proliferation of efforts towards de-escalation. Both nations have re-engaged in dialogue and established a technical framework tasked with scrutinizing the prerequisites for a reopening. Discussions have also facilitated progress on critical security, economic, and legal fronts.
However, Niamey continues to hold firm on its stipulations.
In a recent public address, General Abdourahamane Tiani articulated that the border’s reopening must be contingent upon guarantees, specifically concerning security and the verified absence of forces perceived as hostile operating near the frontier. This position aligns with the stance championed by Nigerien authorities for several years: Niamey asserts that Béninois territory must not serve as a staging ground for operations that could imperil Niger.
The core issue is that Cotonou unequivocally refutes this accusation.
Cotonou denies, Paris also
Since the onset of the crisis, Béninois authorities have consistently dismissed allegations suggesting France operates military bases within Bénin, particularly in the northern regions of the country.
The Béninois government asserts it has never hosted any foreign military base on its sovereign territory. Olushegun Adjadi Bakari, Bénin’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, reiterated this point in January 2025.
Paris, too, has denied the existence of any French military base in northern Bénin. In March 2026, General Fabien Mandon, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, rejected these claims, affirming that no French base exists in that part of the nation.
Nevertheless, a crucial distinction warrants clarification.
France does indeed provide a form of security assistance to Bénin. French military personnel have been involved in training initiatives and offering support to Béninois forces combating armed groups in the country’s north. For instance, in April 2026, it was reported that French special forces were discreetly operating alongside Béninois counterparts. French authorities officially categorize these personnel as trainers.
Therefore, it is essential to differentiate between two aspects: the acknowledged Franco-Béninois military cooperation, which is not disputed, and the existence of a permanent French military base or deployment at the Nigerien border, which both Cotonou and Paris deny.
It is precisely upon this distinction that a significant portion of the ongoing debate hinges.
An exigency that presents Niamey with a new equation
While Niger demands assurances from Bénin, another of Niger’s neighbors is simultaneously re-establishing ties with Paris.
In November 2024, Chad had initially terminated its military cooperation with France, declaring its resolve to fully exercise its sovereignty and diversify its security partnerships.
The French withdrawal was then portrayed as a pivotal shift in relations between N’Djamena and Paris.
However, for several months now, the two capitals have been drawing closer once more. French military personnel are gradually returning to Chad, operating under a significantly more discreet and scaled-back arrangement than previously existed.
This evolving situation addresses a pressing security reality: Chad faces repercussions from the conflict in Sudan, the persistent threat of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin, and substantial requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and logistical capabilities.
N’Djamena can therefore interpret France’s return as a sovereign and pragmatic decision.
But for Niamey, this choice introduces a conundrum.
Chad, too, shares a border with Niger.
Consequently, if Niamey contends that a French military presence near its territory constitutes a sufficiently grave threat to impede the reopening of its border with Bénin, how does Niger intend to respond to the burgeoning Franco-Chadian rapprochement?
Why would Chad be different from Bénin?
Herein lies the true paradox.
Niamey could plausibly argue that every state retains the autonomy to select its military partners. Under this rationale, Bénin would possess the right to collaborate with France, and similarly, Chad would be entitled to rekindle its relationship with Paris.
Yet, if this logic holds, it should also compel Niger not to make Franco-Béninois cooperation a decisive condition for its border’s reopening.
Conversely, if Niamey genuinely believes that French military cooperation with a neighbor poses a threat to its national security, then the same reasoning should, by all accounts, be applicable to Chad.
The question, therefore, is not whether Niger should close its border with Chad.
Rather, it serves to test the fundamental consistency of its argument.
Why would military cooperation with France be deemed unacceptable in Niger’s western neighbor, but acceptable in its eastern neighbor?
Geography renders this question particularly sensitive. Niger shares extensive borders with both Bénin and Chad. Thus, a foreign military presence in Chad could, theoretically, be considered part of Niamey’s immediate strategic environment.
France’s return to Chad, a test for the sovereign doctrine
The Chadian situation unfolds within a dramatically altered regional landscape.
Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have elevated sovereignty and a severance from former partner powers as foundational pillars of their new foreign policy. These three nations have withdrawn from ECOWAS and intensified their collaboration within the Alliance of Sahel States.
Chad, however, has charted a distinct course.
After severing ties with Paris in 2024, N’Djamena now appears intent on resuming military cooperation with France, while simultaneously preserving its other partnerships.
This choice is inherently sovereign.
However, it might prove challenging to reconcile with a conception of sovereignty that would deny neighboring states the right to choose their own partners.
Consequently, it is less about the French presence in Chad and more about the principle of consistency that now occupies the core of this debate.
Towards a resolution between Niamey and Cotonou?
Nonetheless, the situation could evolve.
The ongoing discussions between Niger and Bénin indicate that both countries recognize the economic and security costs associated with their border closure. In the border region, local populations, traders, and transporters have endured the consequences of a political crisis, far exceeding their local interests, for nearly three years.
Furthermore, violence in the border area spanning Bénin, Niger, and Nigeria has significantly escalated, underscoring the imperative for enhanced security cooperation between the two nations.
A reopening of the border could thus become a shared objective.
But to achieve this, Niamey and Cotonou will likely need to transcend the issue of France.
The debate cannot indefinitely remain confined to an opposition between ‘French presence’ and ‘African sovereignty.’
If Niger seeks security guarantees from Bénin, it is entirely legitimate to request them. However, these guarantees must be predicated on verifiable facts, transparent mechanisms, and reciprocal commitments.
Crucially, they must be applied consistently, based on the same principles, to all neighboring states.
The gradual resumption of French military cooperation in Chad thus imparts a new dimension to this crisis.
Niamey is now confronted with a choice: either acknowledge that every sovereign state is free to choose its partners, or uphold a doctrine asserting that French military cooperation with a neighbor constitutes a threat justifying retaliatory measures.
In the former scenario, the reopening of the border with Bénin could be facilitated.
In the latter, the rapprochement between N’Djamena and Paris risks posing a question to Niger that will be difficult to avoid: if France is deemed a threat in Bénin, why would it not be in Chad?
It is perhaps within this apparent contradiction that one of the primary stakes of Sahelian diplomacy currently resides: making sovereignty a universally applicable principle, rather than an instrument wielded selectively based on the shifting power dynamics among neighboring states.
