General Assimi Goïta, the head of Mali’s military junta, resurfaced three days after the coordinated April 25 attacks by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM / JNIM, an Al-Qaeda affiliate) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA, an independentist rebellion). He offered no explanation for his brief absence, instead asserting in an April 29 speech that “the situation is under control.” This declaration came even as the FLA re-established its presence in Kidal and the JNIM initiated a blockade around Bamako. Goïta’s rhetoric focused on vague assurances that his government possesses the necessary military capabilities to defeat non-state armed groups. Yet, six years after his coup, his administration remains largely on the defensive, struggling against hostile entities that dictate the pace of operations for the national army and the entire country. As the military balance of power appears to shift towards these armed factions, many Malians are increasingly contemplating the grim prospect of the JNIM and its allies seizing state power. It is a logic of the worst-case scenario for Mali security.

An inescapable choice: junta or Sharia

This unsettling possibility gains traction as the JNIM now openly declares its intent to deliver a decisive blow to the ruling National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) junta. This intention was solidified in a communiqué where the JNIM specified that, once in control of the state, one of its “essential priorities will be the establishment of Sharia law.” This leaves no room for doubt. In parts of Mali currently under jihadist control, populations are already subject to the strictures of Islamic law.

Some opponents of the military regime have, in recent weeks, attempted to convince themselves that a tactical alliance with the JNIM could lead the group to moderate its Sharia agenda. To oust the junta, these opponents envision a compromise involving a “soft Sharia” – a minimalist form of Islamic law they believe they could accommodate. However, nothing in the pronouncements of the terrorist group, now spearheading the offensive against the junta, suggests that its “victory” would pave the way for a secular and democratic future. Between a military government, largely responsible for Mali’s politics and current chaos, and increasingly triumphant jihadists, citizens yearning for change find themselves trapped in a narrow corridor. The impasse between Sharia and junta is stark.

This dire situation was inadvertently engineered by the CNSP putschists. By seizing state power and relentlessly suppressing all forms of political opposition—imprisoning dissenting voices or forcing them into exile—General Assimi Goïta’s CNSP inadvertently empowered the most feared expression of resistance against its administration. Nature abhors a vacuum, and it is now armed movements and proponents of violent extremism who are poised to drive out an illegal regime that has claimed absolute authority.

The JNIM’s vision for a “new Mali”

As the JNIM imposes a road blockade on the capital, Bamako, threatening to choke the nation’s economy, the junta’s leaders remain entrenched in denial and supposedly triumphant rhetoric. While banking on the loyalty of their increasingly doubtful supporters, the regime intensifies its repressive actions. In what appears to be an internal purge, several military personnel were arrested following the joint JNIM and FLA offensive on April 25. An emblematic example of this desperate trajectory was the May 2 abduction of Mountaga Tall, a prominent lawyer and political figure, by masked individuals – an operational signature often associated with authorities in Bamako. This is critical for Bamako news today.

Regarding this incident, Ousmane Diallo, a senior researcher at Amnesty International, stated: “We have observed a trend of abductions in Mali, perpetrated by agents of the National State Security Agency. Authorities must end restrictions on civic space and human rights abuses, and respect the country’s human rights obligations and commitments.” The junta’s habits are deeply ingrained. The abduction of Mountaga Tall adds to a long list of abuses attributed to a regime that has consistently sown the seeds of its own destruction.

In a communiqué released just before their April 25 offensive, the JNIM jihadists outlined the new direction of their project: “We call upon all sincere patriots, without distinction, to rise up and unite our forces in a common front, including political parties, national armed forces, religious authorities, traditional leaders, and all components of Malian society. It is imperative to end the junta, for a peaceful and inclusive transition for a new Mali.” The military putschists had also promised a “new Mali” to their compatriots. What would the JNIM’s version look like? In its attempt to forge a hypothetical compromise between its maximalist demands based on implementing Sharia and the repressed grievances of traditional political oppositions, the JNIM, much like the junta, offers no guarantees for a return to ordinary constitutional order. The protracted saga of the military regime, which replaced political virtues with the rule of arms, has ultimately exposed the population to a multidimensional tragedy. Currently, nothing suggests a positive outcome to this existential challenge imposed on West Africa Mali.