French political figure Bruno Fuchs recently offered candid insights into the evolving crisis in Mali, outlining France’s perspective. As president of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee and a key centrist (Modem) voice, Fuchs’s statements, made during a recent interview, provide a glimpse into the strategic thinking surrounding the West African nation.
While expressing optimism for France’s renewed standing across the African continent—suggesting that addressing historical “irritants” such as the CFA franc and visa policies could restore its appeal—Fuchs’s commentary revealed an underlying tension. This paradox lies between the declared aim of moving beyond “Françafrique” colonial relations and a persistent focus on reclaiming influence lost to Russian involvement in the region.
A particularly striking and somewhat contentious aspect of his remarks concerned Mali. Bruno Fuchs, echoing sentiments reportedly held by certain French military and political strategists, presented a scenario predicting significant shifts in Mali’s political landscape. He asserted that Russian forces are in the process of negotiating their withdrawal from Mali, anticipating the imminent collapse of the ruling junta in Bamako within weeks or months.
Following President Emmanuel Macron’s recent statement in Nairobi—that “the departure of French military personnel was undoubtedly not the best decision the putschists made for their country”—an interviewer inquired whether France welcomed the perceived military setbacks faced by Russian forces in northern Mali.
“Removing the French partner was counterproductive”
Bruno Fuchs deftly sidestepped a direct answer, instead reiterating President Macron’s sentiment: “Removing the French partner was counterproductive.” The implication was clear. He then elaborated on his prediction, stating, “I believe the Malian junta has only days or weeks left. Currently, it finds itself in a vulnerable position relative to the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Therefore, a change in Mali’s leadership is inevitable within weeks or months.”
The parliamentarian then ventured into what many might consider highly sensitive territory. He suggested that Malians face a choice between “integrist jihadists”—a description he qualified as a “curious concept” and “not applicable to all”—and the FLA, versus a return to democratic life, public liberties, and the “life before” in Mali. He emphasized that “life in Mali is likely to change,” seemingly overlooking the fourteen years of conflict that have already deeply affected the nation’s populace.
“How to integrate JNIM?“
With unwavering confidence, Bruno Fuchs proceeded to outline potential political futures for Mali. He presented two main scenarios. The first involves Bamako entering negotiations. “If the junta and President Assimi Goïta are reasonable,” Fuchs posited, “they will initiate negotiations.” This would lead to a three-to-six-month transitional period, overseen by a military figure from the current Transition—though not Assimi Goïta himself—culminating in elections. Fuchs acknowledged the ambitious timeline but highlighted a central question arising from such a transition, especially if influenced by JNIM: “How do we integrate JNIM into governance and collaborative efforts?” This formulation is particularly noteworthy, considering JNIM’s known affiliation with al-Qaeda and the fact that its leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, was once France’s primary adversary in the Sahel, a conflict in which France lost 57 soldiers.
Fuchs claimed to possess firsthand information regarding JNIM’s intentions, perhaps even more than most Malians themselves. He revealed, “I believe JNIM is prepared to lay down its arms and cease armed conflict, provided they can participate in the country’s political life, not to seize control of Mali, but to be involved in its political processes.” The president of the Foreign Affairs Committee did not elaborate on why the most powerful actor on the ground would settle for mere participation without asserting dominance. This presents a crucial dilemma for European and French stakeholders: “Do we support this transition where JNIM has a political role, or do we not?” Fuchs confessed to not having an immediate answer, framing it as a “real problem of conscience and a real political problem.” Indeed, this is a profound question, not just for “us, Europeans or French,” but first and foremost for the Malian people.
“The worst: Afghanistan“
- Bruno Fuchs then introduced a second potential scenario. “The junta attempts absolute resistance, refuses to negotiate, and eventually finds itself in a weakened position,” he explained. With Russian forces reportedly negotiating their withdrawal, “the junta will eventually fall.” He warned that “if it’s not negotiated, it will certainly be worse than if there had been a negotiation.” He left open the question of “worse for whom”—Mali, the region, or France.
Returning to his first scenario, the parliamentarian elaborated on the potential outcomes of the hoped-for negotiations. He suggested models such as a “Mauritanian-style scheme, meaning a religious regime,” or a “Nigerian model, which involves a federal state in Mali where some states or a single state apply Sharia law, while others do not.” This federal approach, with diverse regimes, would “guarantee the representativeness and role of each community in the country’s political life, similar to Nigeria, for example.” This particular scenario appeared to be Fuchs’s preference: a moderately Islamic Republic where community representation is secured. He did not specify how this would be achieved, which would have advanced the discussion. A key challenge in Mali, he implicitly acknowledged, is that communities coexist within the same geographical areas rather than in segregated “bantustans,” rendering his proposals somewhat vague, if not entirely nebulous.
The second, and “ultimate scheme,” according to Fuchs, is an “Afghanistan” scenario. While seemingly comfortable with the first, he stated, “I do not wish for an Afghanistan to emerge in the heart of the Sahel, because that would have repercussions across the entire region.” This includes not only the Sahelian nations but also their “innocent” neighbors: Guinea, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Bénin, and Togo. He concluded, “Complicated,” an understatement for such a dire prospect.
“The Russians would be ready to return”
Slightly taken aback by these definitive pronouncements, the interviewer pressed further: “Do you have information indicating that the Russians are preparing to leave Bamako?”
Bruno Fuchs responded without hesitation: “They are negotiating. They have consolidated their positions. Negotiations are currently underway.” The outcome, he noted, remains uncertain, dependent on both JNIM and the junta. However, he expressed certainty that the Russians “would be prepared to withdraw, provided certain guarantees are secured regarding the assets they currently exploit in Mali, such as gold mines, for which they are keen not to feel dispossessed, even if their legitimacy to exploit them is, in my opinion, quite debatable.”
Despite advocating for the closure of the “Françafrique” chapter—describing it as “colonial behavior” and “an unresolved history with francophone Africa,” characterized by imposing “our truths and views” and intolerance of resistance—Bruno Fuchs still expressed strong opinions on the legitimacy of resource exploitation in Mali. The underlying message was that France, and by extension “Europe, so as not to be immodest,” holds greater legitimacy than Russia. His reasoning centered on France’s “reliability in its commitments,” contrasting it with Americans and Russians “who are currently leaving Mali because things are not going well for them.” In a slight contradiction, he then cited the Central African Republic, where “we have normalized our relations, re-established normal relations with President Faustin Archange Touadéra” despite the continued Russian presence. He concluded, “We must learn to work with everyone.” This broad statement, however, notably excludes the leaders of the Alliance of Sahel States, who remain in disfavor.
