Captain Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso’s transitional president, ruled out any normalisation of diplomatic ties with France during an interview broadcast in late September, using unusually sharp language to criticise Paris. The remarks reinforce the course his government has followed since taking power in September 2022: a gradual break with the former French partner and a reorientation of Burkinabè diplomacy toward new allies, Russia foremost among them.
A break with Paris that does not, by itself, guarantee independence
Since seizing power, Traoré has repeatedly voiced hostility toward France, while relations between Ouagadougou and Paris have deteriorated sharply. The withdrawal of French forces, the departure of diplomats and the questioning of several forms of cooperation have marked that rupture. At the same time, the Burkinabè authorities have strengthened ties with Moscow and consolidated their alignment with Mali and Niger inside the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Presented by the authorities as a reconquest of national sovereignty, this diplomatic shift deserves scrutiny beyond political rhetoric. A sovereign state is free to choose its partners, but those choices must allow it to preserve its decision-making autonomy, strengthen national capacities and durably improve living conditions for its people.
The central question is therefore straightforward: has Burkina Faso genuinely freed itself from external influence, or has it simply replaced one historical partner with another whose interests do not necessarily coincide with its own?
Rejecting France has become a central element of Traoré’s political message. The stance resonates with part of the population, shaped by a long history of unbalanced relations with the former colonial power and by frustrations over the results of past cooperation.
Yet denouncing French influence is not, in itself, a complete sovereignty policy. Breaking with one partner does not automatically mean becoming independent of all external influence. True sovereignty is also measured by a country’s ability to define its priorities, diversify its partnerships, negotiate balanced agreements and refuse pressure, whatever its origin.
By presenting the rupture with Paris as major proof of national emancipation, the Burkinabè authorities risk reducing a complex issue to a contest between two foreign powers. France becomes the symbol of past dependence, while Russia is portrayed as the solution to that dependence.
That reading needs nuance. No foreign partner Western, Russian, Chinese or from any other region bases its foreign policy exclusively on defending a third country’s interests. States defend their own strategic, economic, military and diplomatic interests first. Russia is no exception.
Russia: a strategic ally, but not a selfless partner
The rapprochement between Ouagadougou and Moscow is one of the most visible changes in Burkinabè foreign policy since Traoré took power. Security cooperation occupies a prominent place in this new orientation, as Burkina Faso confronts persistent insecurity linked to armed terrorist groups.
For the Burkinabè authorities, diversifying military partners can be a way to strengthen national capacities and move away from cooperation deemed insufficient with France. That choice falls within Burkina Faso’s sovereign right.
The question, however, should not be whether Russia is preferable to France in principle, but what Burkina Faso concretely obtains from this new relationship.
What are each side’s commitments? What are the financial, military or economic counterparts? How long do the agreements last? What guarantees frame foreign partners’ interventions? And above all, to what extent does this cooperation durably strengthen the Burkinabè army’s own capacities?
These questions are essential. Military cooperation can bring operational support, equipment or technical expertise. But it does not automatically guarantee a lasting improvement in the security situation. Its effectiveness must be judged on verifiable results: protection of civilians, securing of road corridors, return of displaced people and the ability of public services to function in areas hit by violence.
It would therefore be premature to treat the rapprochement with Moscow alone as proof of strategic success. Conversely, it would be just as excessive to conclude, without examining the agreements and results, that Russia dictates every decision of the Burkinabè authorities.
The real issue is whether this partnership increases Burkina Faso’s decision-making capacity or creates new forms of dependence.
Changing partners does not necessarily mean changing the system of dependence
One paradox of Traoré’s policy lies in how sovereignty is framed in public debate. The authorities say they want to free Burkina Faso from Western influence, but that ambition cannot be assessed solely through statements against France or rapprochements with Moscow.
Sovereignty is not limited to the choice of military partners. It also concerns control over natural resources, budget policy, economic independence, industrial capacity, food security and the freedom to negotiate with foreign investors.
A country can break with a former partner power while remaining dependent on other actors for military equipment, technology, financing or certain export markets. Such dependence is not necessarily submission, since international relations often rest on interdependence. It becomes problematic, however, when alternative options are limited and the country struggles to defend its own priorities.
Burkina Faso must therefore be judged on its ability to genuinely diversify its relations, develop national skills and negotiate transparent partnerships.
If Russia becomes an indispensable partner in certain areas without the country having credible alternatives, the risk would be the emergence of a new dependence — even if it is presented under a different political narrative.
This is not to claim that Moscow controls Traoré’s decisions, since no evidence supports such a conclusion. It is rather to recall an obvious fact of international relations: a foreign partner, however politically close, pursues its own interests and cannot be considered selfless by principle.
The AES: a sovereignty ambition that must also prove itself
The alignment between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger within the Alliance of Sahel States fits this desire to redefine regional power relations. The three countries emphasise their sovereignty, their willingness to coordinate policies and their ambition to strengthen autonomy vis-à-vis external partners.
In principle, regional cooperation can be a major lever. It can facilitate pooled defence resources, intelligence coordination, trade and the search for common solutions to Sahel challenges.
But a political alliance does not by itself guarantee effective collective action. It must demonstrate its ability to produce concrete results for populations.
On security, persistent attacks, population displacements and difficulties in certain localities require a rigorous evaluation of the strategies adopted. The situation cannot be assessed solely through official statements or talk of territorial reconquest. It requires verifiable data, comparison over time and particular attention to the situation of civilians.
On the economic front, the ambition of regional integration must also translate into smoother trade, suitable infrastructure and mechanisms to support producers, traders and businesses.
Finally, the sovereignty claimed by the AES should also manifest itself in its members’ ability to maintain diversified relations with several partners, without turning their opposition to certain powers into the exclusive guiding principle of their diplomacy.
A sovereign alliance is not one that simply changes camps, but one that retains the freedom to choose, to negotiate and, if necessary, to say no to its own allies.
Political sovereignty cannot overshadow the results people expect
Beyond diplomatic questions, the debate on sovereignty must be placed back in the daily lives of Burkinabè citizens.
For populations facing insecurity, displacement, economic hardship or limited access to certain public services, the essential question remains results.
The break with France may be an assumed political choice. The rapprochement with Russia may also meet strategic objectives. But these decisions do not exempt the authorities from accountability for their effectiveness.
Personal security, continuity of public services, access to healthcare and education, job opportunities and protection of economic activities are all indicators for evaluating a government’s action.
It would therefore be insufficient to measure the success of Traoré’s policy by the number of statements hostile to Paris, symbols of diplomatic rupture or multiplying meetings with Russian officials.
Results must be examined on the ground, using reliable and independent indicators.
Sovereignty cannot be merely a diplomatic posture. It must translate into a greater capacity of the state to protect its citizens, finance its priorities and meet its population’s needs.
The real test: Burkina Faso’s freedom of decision
By rejecting any normalisation with France, Traoré confirms his choice of a lasting political break with Paris. But this orientation raises a fundamental question about the very conception of sovereignty defended by his regime.
A truly independent country must be able to choose its partners without submitting to their demands, maintain relations with several powers and defend its interests without being captive to its alliances.
France has its interests. Russia has its own. Other powers also pursue their own objectives. No diplomatic rapprochement should therefore be assessed solely on the basis of ideological proximity between leaders.
Burkina Faso has the right to diversify its partnerships and redefine its strategic priorities. But it is up to its authorities to demonstrate that this reorientation produces measurable results and effectively strengthens the country’s autonomy.
The question is not to systematically defend Paris against Moscow, nor to regard Russia as an adversary by principle. It is to know whether the choices made durably serve Burkina Faso’s interests.
For, at bottom, sovereignty is not proclaimed only in speeches against the former colonial power: it is verified in the capacity to decide freely, negotiate without constraint and obtain concrete results for one’s people.
And it is precisely on that ground that Traoré’s policy must be evaluated, beyond slogans, alliances and diplomatic statements.
By Sidi Mohamed — Journaliste / Rédacteur