By officially assuming the responsibilities of the Minister of Defense alongside his role as Head of State, Colonel Assimi Goïta has finalized the total centralization of authority in Bamako. This strategic shift, far from being a routine administrative adjustment, appears to be an admission of a fractured command structure and a military strategy that is losing momentum. Following the tactical setback in Kidal, which has fallen under the control of the JNIM and the FLA, and amidst growing doubts regarding the effectiveness of Russian military partners, Mali is entering a period of unprecedented instability.
The Koulouba Palace becomes the center of military operations
In Bamako, all decision-making now converges at the Koulouba Palace. By combining the presidency with the defense portfolio, Colonel Assimi Goïta is no longer just the political visionary; he has become the primary operational leader of the armed forces. For many regional analysts, this consolidation signals a deepening mistrust within the inner circle of power.
Within the context of a prolonged transition, this hyper-centralization raises a critical question: how can one individual effectively manage state affairs, regional diplomacy, and the granular tactical details of an asymmetric conflict? This accumulation of roles seems like a high-stakes gamble. By removing ministerial buffers, Assimi Goïta is now directly on the front line. Any future military failure will no longer be attributed to a subordinate but will be seen as a personal defeat for the Head of State.
The Kidal setback: from perceived victory to loss of control
Only months ago, official propaganda celebrated the “liberation” of Kidal with great fanfare. It was presented as the ultimate symbol of restored sovereignty and the crowning achievement of the transition. However, the harsh reality on the ground has dampened those spirits. The city, a vital strategic hub in the North, has once again fallen into the hands of armed groups, specifically the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the forces of the CMA/FLA.
This reversal is more than just symbolic; it is a major tactical blow. The insurgent takeover of Kidal demonstrates that the Malian army, despite claims of increased capability, struggles to maintain long-term control over reclaimed territories. The lack of civil administration and the resulting security vacuum allowed for a swift reoccupation by jihadist groups and separatist rebels. The JNIM, in particular, has refined its approach by isolating military outposts and severing supply lines, turning Bamako‘s temporary gains into fleeting successes.
The Russian partnership: Africa Corps under pressure
The other cornerstone of Assimi Goïta‘s security framework is the alliance with Russia, represented by the paramilitaries formerly known as Wagner (now operating as Africa Corps). While this partnership was marketed as a sovereign alternative to the former colonial power, France, the actual security outcomes remain unconvincing.
Russian operatives, though active in high-conflict zones, appear to favor a scorched-earth policy that tends to radicalize local populations rather than pacify them. Reports of human rights violations are increasing, providing a recruitment boost for extremist organizations. Furthermore, the technical proficiency of these instructors is being questioned as Malian military convoys continue to fall victim to devastating ambushes. With Russia preoccupied by its own conflict in Europe, it is uncertain if it can provide Mali with the sustained aerial and technological support required to counter the highly mobile JNIM forces.
A breakdown in regional diplomacy
This escalating security crisis is unfolding against a backdrop of increasing diplomatic isolation. By withdrawing from ECOWAS to establish the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Mali opted for a path of security self-reliance. However, the reality is unforgiving: borders remain porous, and terrorism does not respect national boundaries.
By distancing itself from regional cooperation frameworks, Bamako has lost access to vital intelligence and logistical support from its neighbors. The concentration of power in Assimi Goïta‘s hands is viewed by neighboring capitals as an authoritarian hardening that makes dialogue even more difficult. Mali now finds itself in a contradictory position: attempting to assert sovereignty through military force while becoming increasingly dependent on opaque external actors and a command chain held by a single man.
The risk of long-term stagnation in Mali
For the people living in Central and Northern Mali, the situation is dire. Despite shifting geopolitical alliances and leadership changes, insecurity continues to spread. Attacks on both civilian and military transport have become a daily occurrence.
The new “President-Minister of Defense” is wagering everything on this move. If the security landscape does not improve quickly, the social unrest currently suppressed by tight security measures may eventually erupt. Africa‘s history is filled with examples where the excessive concentration of power served as a precursor to major national instability.
To break this deadlock, Mali must reconsider its overarching strategy. Pure military force and reliance on mercenary groups have reached their limits. Without a return to inclusive governance and a plan to socially reintegrate these territories, Colonel Assimi Goïta‘s efforts may fail against the persistence of armed groups. The time for wartime rhetoric has passed; urgent political realism is now required to save the Malian state from the shifting sands of the North.
